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2026-02-06 | BY Bao Yinan
February 1, 2026 marks the fifth anniversary of the official implementation of the Coast Guard Law of the People’s Republic of China. On January 30, Zhang Jianming, the Director of the China Coast Guard, briefed the public on the progress of maritime rights protection and law enforcement since the law’s enactment.
2026-02-04 | BY Mu Jiahao
Since December 2025, the US has boarded and seized 7 tankers involved in Venezuelan oil transportation and trade within “international waters” of the Caribbean Sea and North Atlantic. This series of seizures should be viewed as an extension of the maritime blockade against Venezuela initiated by the US in December 2025, albeit with a broader scope and involving more nations. Among the 7 seized tankers, some were owned by US-sanctioned entities, others had transported crude oil to countries such as Russia and Iran, and several even had connections to China. The legal basis cited by the US for this series of seizures combines domestic and international law, encompassing unilateral sanctions alongside counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism measures. Understanding this “hybrid lawfare” initiated by the US in the Caribbean is key to comprehending the US maritime strategy.
2026-02-04 | BY Bao Yinan
February 1, 2026 marks the fifth anniversary of the official implementation of the Coast Guard Law of the People’s Republic of China. On January 30, Zhang Jianming, the Director of the China Coast Guard, briefed the public on the progress of maritime rights protection and law enforcement since the law’s enactment.
2025-11-22 | BY SCSPI
2025年11月17日，新加坡南洋理工大学拉惹勒南国际问题研究院（RSIS）院长库马尔·拉马克里什纳（Kumar Ramakrishna)一行到访“南海战略态势感知计划”（SCSPI），并与SCSPI举行SCSPI-RSIS第六次南海圆桌会议。
2025-10-09 | BY Dong Shijie
If the Philippines implements the partial provisions of the Act that violate UNCLOS, it would have the following negative impacts on the passage of all other countries’ ships and aircraft: Firstly, it would reduce the number of archipelagic sea lanes. By only designating 3 sea lanes and refusing to designate the remaining sea lanes, as well as denying foreign ships and aircraft the exercise of the right of arhipelagic sea lanes passage through all other routes normally used for international navigation, the implementation of the Act would significantly reduce the number of archipelagic sea lanes available for foreign ships and aircraft, especially the absence of the east-west sea lanes crossing the middle of the Philippines. Secondly, it would restrict or even deny the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage. As for the designated limited archipelagic sea lanes, the Act seeks to expand Philippine control over foreign ships and aircraft, and even to completely deny the passage right of foreign ships and aircraft in the name of violating the principle of reciprocity and mutual respect. Therefore, once the Philippines starts to enforce the Act, it would inevitably impair the passage rights of all other countries’ ships and aircraft.