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2026-09-02 | BY Zheng Zhihua
This Article examines the legal and geopolitical implications of the 2026 decision by Japan and the Philippines to negotiate exclusive-economic-zone and continental-shelf boundaries in waters east of Taiwan. It asks whether the contemplated area is legally separable from China’s claims, whether a bilateral line could prejudice third-party rights, what responses remain open to China, and which actor is altering the status quo. Beginning from the principle that the land dominates the sea, the Article argues that coastal projections from Taiwan’s eastern coast, Japan’s Sakishima/Yaeyama Islands, and the Philippines’ Batanes Islands may substantially overlap. The fact that Japanese and Philippine features lie less than 400 nautical miles apart establishes a possible bilateral overlap, but not an exclusively bilateral geography; continental-shelf entitlements may also extend beyond 200 nautical miles under Article 76 of UNCLOS. Because Japan and the Philippines have disclosed neither a negotiating map nor controlling base points, coordinates, or endpoints, they have not demonstrated the separability of the proposed delimitation area. Although a bilateral treaty cannot bind China without its consent, a fixed endpoint and the incorporation of coordinates into charts, licences, enforcement practices, or security arrangements could prejudice China’s legal and practical position. International jurisprudence therefore supports geographic restraint, open endpoints, and effective non-prejudice safeguards. China may preserve its claims through diplomatic representations, protests, and maritime presence according international and domestic law. Finally, the parallel expansion of Japan–Philippines defense cooperation creates a risk of securitizing the boundary and may blur their one-China positions by implying who is entitled to represent Taiwan-facing coasts.
2026-08-02 | BY Bao Yinan
On July 27, the U.S. “Department of War” released the Annual Freedom of Navigation Report for Fiscal Year 2025 (hereinafter the “2025 Annual Report”) on its official website. This is also the first edition of the Annual Freedom of Navigation Report issued since the U.S. Department of Defense was “renamed” the “Department of War” in September 2025.
2026-07-14 | BY Zheng Zhihua
The South China Sea will ultimately be stabilised not by legal absolutism, but by political accommodation grounded in international law, sustained dialogue and regional ownership. Those objectives remain more important today than they were when the award was issued ten years ago.
2026-07-02 | BY SCSPI
In March 1947, the U.S. and the Philippines signed the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) and the Military Assistance Agreement (MAA), granting the U.S. rent-free use of 23 Philippine bases for a period of 99 years. Concurrently, the U.S. provided military funding, weapons and equipment, training, and technical assistance to help the Philippines stabilize its political situation and build its armed forces. In August 1951, the two countries signed the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), which commits both parties to jointly resist potential external armed attacks, marking the formal establishment of the U.S.-Philippine alliance. In September 1966, the Ramos-Rusk Agreement reduced the lease term from 99 years to 25 years. In September 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected a new agreement that would have extended U.S. base rights, forcing the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Philippine bases. Subsequently, the U.S. military maintained a temporary presence and conducted joint training in the Philippines through the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA).
2026-06-25 | BY SCSPI
In 2025, the US military continued to strengthen its military deterrence against China, maintaining high-intensity operations including close-in reconnaissance, Taiwan Strait transits, forward presence, strategic cruising, military exercises and drills, as well as battlefield preparation in the South China Sea and its surrounding areas. Among them, large reconnaissance aircraft conducted about 1,200 missions, and ocean surveillance and oceanographic survey ships accumulated 197 ship days of activity. Carrier strike groups (CSGs) have entered the South China Sea 9 times, demonstrating a strong presence. At least 11 nuclear submarines appeared in the region throughout the year, signaling a clear deterrence intention. Furthermore, bombers conducted 13 sorties across 7 deployments into the South China Sea and its surrounding areas, frequently rehearsing “north-south converging maneuvers” and “distributed operations”.