Disregard for General Wei: Intended ignorance of an attempt to find common ground and explain China's perceptions?
2022-06-18 | BY Mark Hoskin
Drawing a comparison with the US’ own history as a development of the often-repeated boilerplate statement concerning Taiwan should be considered further and widely discussed, even if people might not agree with China’s statement for strategic or political reasons.
2022-05-11 | BY Lucio Blanco Pitlo III
The second Marcos administration is expected to inject much policy continuity in dealing with the South China Sea. Bongbong can leverage his father’s role in laying the cornerstone of the 47-year-old official ties and Duterte’s friendly policy in the last six years to set ties on a good footing. Such goodwill can serve as a robust ballast to allow the two countries to insulate broader ties from the turbulence brought by the longstanding row.
2022-05-05 | BY Mark J. Valencia
The U.S. is setting a dangerous example by unilaterally asserting and implementing its interpretations of terms in a treaty it has not ratified. If many coastal states enact unilateral national legislation prohibiting certain military and intelligence gathering activities by drones in and above their jurisdictional zones, then the prohibition against conducting such missions could become part of customary international law through state practice, despite the opposition of a few countries like the U.S. and its allies.
2022-03-27 | BY SCSPI
In 2021, as the US placed great emphasis on military deterrence against China, the US armed forces maintained a high tempo of military activities in the South China Sea, such as close-in reconnaissance operations, Taiwan Strait transits, forward presence, strategic deterrence, “freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs)”, military exercises and drills, and battlefield preparation. Specifically, large reconnaissance aircraft conducted nearly 1,200 close-in reconnaissance sorties over the South China Sea, several of which came close to only around 20 nautical miles away from China’s baselines. The US carrier strike groups (CSGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) entered the South China Sea 12 times, more than twice the frequency in 2020. At least 11 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) deployed to the South China Sea and its surrounding waters throughout the year, among which the Seawolf-class fast-attack submarine USS Connecticut (SSN-22) even “struck an underwater mountain” in the northern waters of the South China Sea. In addition, with a significantly stronger focus on China, the US military has given more emphasis to “great power competition” with respect to strategies, tactics, concepts of operations (CONOPS) and weapons research and development.
2022-03-21 | BY Hu Bo
In recent years, amid the backdrop of intensified China-US military competition, both sides agree on strengthening maritime crisis management. Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden emphasized the importance of managing competition in the video call for multiple times. Before the new progress, it is necessary to summarize current mechanisms for China-US maritime crisis management.