Recent content
2026-10-26 | BY Hu Bo
On October 7th–8th, 2026, Hu Bo, director of SCSPI and Director of Center for Maritime Strategy at Peking University were invited to attend the 18th South China Sea International Conference hosted by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in Hanoi, Vietnam. He delivered a keynote address titled “The Changing Balance of Power and Its Influence in the South China Sea.”
2026-10-22 | BY SCSPI
On October 7th–8th, Hu Bo, director of SCSPI and Director of Center for Maritime Strategy at Peking University, and Yu Minna, research fellow of SCSPI and associate professor at the Law School of Ocean University of China, were invited to attend the 18th South China Sea International Conference hosted by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in Hanoi, Vietnam.
2026-09-02 | BY Zheng Zhihua
This Article examines the legal and geopolitical implications of the 2026 decision by Japan and the Philippines to negotiate exclusive-economic-zone and continental-shelf boundaries in waters east of Taiwan. It asks whether the contemplated area is legally separable from China’s claims, whether a bilateral line could prejudice third-party rights, what responses remain open to China, and which actor is altering the status quo. Beginning from the principle that the land dominates the sea, the Article argues that coastal projections from Taiwan’s eastern coast, Japan’s Sakishima/Yaeyama Islands, and the Philippines’ Batanes Islands may substantially overlap. The fact that Japanese and Philippine features lie less than 400 nautical miles apart establishes a possible bilateral overlap, but not an exclusively bilateral geography; continental-shelf entitlements may also extend beyond 200 nautical miles under Article 76 of UNCLOS. Because Japan and the Philippines have disclosed neither a negotiating map nor controlling base points, coordinates, or endpoints, they have not demonstrated the separability of the proposed delimitation area. Although a bilateral treaty cannot bind China without its consent, a fixed endpoint and the incorporation of coordinates into charts, licences, enforcement practices, or security arrangements could prejudice China’s legal and practical position. International jurisprudence therefore supports geographic restraint, open endpoints, and effective non-prejudice safeguards. China may preserve its claims through diplomatic representations, protests, and maritime presence according international and domestic law. Finally, the parallel expansion of Japan–Philippines defense cooperation creates a risk of securitizing the boundary and may blur their one-China positions by implying who is entitled to represent Taiwan-facing coasts.
2026-08-02 | BY Bao Yinan
On July 27, the U.S. “Department of War” released the Annual Freedom of Navigation Report for Fiscal Year 2025 (hereinafter the “2025 Annual Report”) on its official website. This is also the first edition of the Annual Freedom of Navigation Report issued since the U.S. Department of Defense was “renamed” the “Department of War” in September 2025.
2026-07-14 | BY Zheng Zhihua
The South China Sea will ultimately be stabilised not by legal absolutism, but by political accommodation grounded in international law, sustained dialogue and regional ownership. Those objectives remain more important today than they were when the award was issued ten years ago.