MILITARY POSTURE
2026-07-02 | BY SCSPI
In March 1947, the U.S. and the Philippines signed the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) and the Military Assistance Agreement (MAA), granting the U.S. rent-free use of 23 Philippine bases for a period of 99 years. Concurrently, the U.S. provided military funding, weapons and equipment, training, and technical assistance to help the Philippines stabilize its political situation and build its armed forces. In August 1951, the two countries signed the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), which commits both parties to jointly resist potential external armed attacks, marking the formal establishment of the U.S.-Philippine alliance. In September 1966, the Ramos-Rusk Agreement reduced the lease term from 99 years to 25 years. In September 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected a new agreement that would have extended U.S. base rights, forcing the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Philippine bases. Subsequently, the U.S. military maintained a temporary presence and conducted joint training in the Philippines through the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA).
2026-06-25 | BY SCSPI
In 2025, the US military continued to strengthen its military deterrence against China, maintaining high-intensity operations including close-in reconnaissance, Taiwan Strait transits, forward presence, strategic cruising, military exercises and drills, as well as battlefield preparation in the South China Sea and its surrounding areas. Among them, large reconnaissance aircraft conducted about 1,200 missions, and ocean surveillance and oceanographic survey ships accumulated 197 ship days of activity. Carrier strike groups (CSGs) have entered the South China Sea 9 times, demonstrating a strong presence. At least 11 nuclear submarines appeared in the region throughout the year, signaling a clear deterrence intention. Furthermore, bombers conducted 13 sorties across 7 deployments into the South China Sea and its surrounding areas, frequently rehearsing “north-south converging maneuvers” and “distributed operations”.
2026-05-25 | BY SCSPI
In 2025, non-US extra-regional countries continued to expand their military presence in the Western Pacific, undertaking activities such as reconnaissance patrols, Taiwan Strait transits, forward deployments, drills and exercises, as well as port calls. The UK and France deployed carrier strike groups (CSGs) to the region, and conducted joint drills with allies like the US and Japan. Australia performed multiple declaratory operations in the name of defending “freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea and participated in multilateral maritime cooperation activities led by the Philippines. Additionally, countries such as Canada, New Zealand, and India actively took part in multinational patrols and exercises.
2026-04-21 | BY Chen Yong
从目前形势看，无论美以伊战争以何种方式结束，霍尔木兹海峡的秩序都不可能恢复到战前状态。美国海上优势及制海权遭到了伊朗依托特殊地理条件的海上拒止，这再次暴露出21世纪海洋强国力量投送和运用的局限，尽管美国海军和海军陆战队已为濒海作战和应对区域拒止作战磨刀霍霍多年。如何应对伊朗在战时建立起的对霍尔木兹海峡及通行规则的主导、对海湾秩序的塑造能力，恐怕将成为国际社会不得不面对的议题。
2025-09-16 | BY SCSPI
Through the RQ-4’s high-altitude strategic early warning, the MQ-4C’s wide-area maritime surveillance, and the MQ-9’s tactical support and strike capabilities, the U.S. has established a layered and collaborative large-scale UAV ISR network in the South China Sea and its surrounding areas.
2025-08-11 | BY Bao Yinan , Zheng Zhihua
This article will analyze the legal nature of the actions of the Xue Long 2 and the USCG aircraft involved in this incident. It will then examine the legal uncertainties surrounding the U.S. claim to an “extended continental shelf”, thereby revealing the “double standard” inherent in the U.S. authorities’ version of “freedom of the seas” and its nature of running counter to the international rule of law.
2025-03-25 | BY SCSPI
In 2024, the US military continued to strengthen its military deterrence against China, maintaining high-intensity operations including close-in reconnaissance, Taiwan Strait transits, forward presence, strategic cruising, military exercises and drills, as well as battlefield preparation in the South China Sea and its surrounding areas. Among them, large reconnaissance aircraft conducted about 1,000 missions, and ocean surveillance and measurement vessels accumulated 706 ship days of activity, marking a significant increase compared to 2023. Carrier strike groups (CSGs) have entered the South China Sea 8 times, demonstrating a strong presence. At least 11 nuclear attack submarines, two guided missile submarines and one ballistic missile submarine appeared in the region throughout the year, signaling a clear deterrence intention. Additionally, the number of batches and sorties of bombers entering the South China Sea has significantly increased, with frequent exercises of “north-south double” and “distributed operations”.
2025-01-18 | BY Hu Bo
In the South China Sea, three types of contradictions—maritime disputes, geopolitical competition and rules and order games—will persist in the long term and continue to escalate. Meanwhile, with an increasingly strengthening influence and power to control the situation, China may lack the ability and conditions to resolve the issues in the short term, but is competent to manage the situation.
2024-10-30 | BY SCSPI
In MDA, the Philippines heavily relies on external support whether on equipment, platforms, systems or data. Despite acquiring quite a few new equipment, platforms and programs in recent years, a cohesive capability has not formed yet, leading to struggling progress.
2024-10-28 | BY Zheng Zhihua, Yan Pan
The Philippines is attempting to exploit the legal ambiguity to advance its territorial expansionist agenda by issuing contradictory statements regarding 'a commissioned warship,' 'a permanent station,' and 'low-tide elevation that cannot be be appropriated or subjected to sovereignty claims'. This strategy to disguise its territorial expansionist intentions by exploiting legal ambiguity is simply an attempt to conceal its true motives. Such disingenuous behavior must be scrutinized and addressed.