Taking Maritime Hegemony and “Double Standards” to the Extreme

On July 27, the U.S. “Department of War” released the Annual Freedom of Navigation Report for Fiscal Year 2025 (hereinafter the “2025 Annual Report”) on its official website.[1] This is also the first edition of the Annual Freedom of Navigation Report issued since the U.S. Department of Defense was “renamed” the “Department of War” in September 2025. A review of the report reveals several features regarding the report itself and the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) conducted by the U.S. military during Fiscal Year 2025 (spanning from October 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025), which can be specifically characterized by a combination of “changes” and “continuities”. While the wording of the report, the maritime claims challenged with respect to China, and the manner in which the operations were publicly presented have changed to some extent from previous editions, the supposedly “global” and “peaceful” nature of FONOPs remains highly selective. More importantly, the fundamental “double standards” applied by the United States to its allies and non-allies remain essentially unchanged.

The Report Returns to a “Full-Length” Format, but Flaws Remain

Perhaps the most immediately noticeable feature of the 2025 Annual Report is its return to a “full-length” format. Unlike the extremely “abbreviated” version of the Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2024, released by the then “Department of Defense” in August 2025,[2] which consisted of only a three-page table listing challenges to allegedly “excessive maritime claims”, the present report once again includes a cover page bearing the departmental insignia and references to the relevant statutory authority, as well as explanatory text introducing the objectives and basic circumstances of the Freedom of Navigation Program and summarizing the FONOPs conducted during the fiscal year.

A closer comparison between the 2025 Annual Report and the previous “full-length” edition, namely the 2023 Annual Report, nevertheless reveals two notable differences beyond the replacement of the departmental insignia on the cover from “Department of Defense” to “Department of War”. First, the words “Unclassified” appear prominently in green in both the header and footer of all seven pages, continuing the use of the “Unclassified” marking that first appeared in the 2024 Annual Report. Second, the bottom of the cover page no longer contains basic information such as the report’s production cost and date of generation, which had been included in the 2023 Annual Report and several preceding editions. As of now, neither the U.S. Department of State nor USNI News has published any news concerning the report, so the reasons behind these detailed changes remain unclear. At least one point, however, seems clear: compared with the highly perfunctory 2024 Annual Report released in August 2025, the present report appears to indicate that the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Annual Report has largely returned to “normal” after the “disarray” of the first year of Trump 2.0.

Second, like several previous editions, the present report contains several flaws that appear somewhat amateurish. For example, in the section summarizing annual FONOPs, the report advises readers to “refer to the Digest of United States Practice in International Law” for authoritative information on U.S. diplomatic communications concerning freedom of navigation. In fact, however, the Digest, compiled and published by the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State, has not been updated for more than two years. The most recent edition remains the 2023 volume.[3] Similarly, the summary section of the report states that the U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General’s website contains a “Maritime Claims Reference Manual” page with an “up-to-date list of all excessive maritime claims advanced around the world”, tracking the maritime claims of “156 claimants”. In fact, the website lists 158 claimants, not 156.[4] The figure of 156 was the statistic used in the 2023 Annual Report two years ago. It is therefore apparent that the authors of the present report simply copied and pasted material from the report of two years earlier without making the necessary updates.

Persistent Hypocrisy and “Double Standards”

With respect to the substantive content of the 2025 Annual Report, it can be said that it continues to reflect two major characteristics of U.S. FONOPs: hypocrisy and “double standards”.

The first is the hypocritical nature of FONOPs. This is manifested specifically in their regional selectivity and their non-peaceful nature. The report emphasizes that the “Department of War” implements the Freedom of Navigation Program “in a principled and comprehensive manner”, and that it challenges “excessive maritime claims” asserted by “a wide variety of coastal states on a worldwide basis, irrespective of the identity of the coastal States”. According to the report, the U.S. military challenged 32 “excessive maritime claims” advanced by 17 claimants during fiscal year 2025, an increase from the 19 claims involving 11 claimants challenged during the previous fiscal year.

Yet these challenges are by no means as “worldwide” as the report claims. An analysis of the 17 claimants specifically identified in the report shows that 11 Asian claimants, including China, were subject to challenges. By contrast, only one European claimant, Albania, and one African claimant, Libya, were challenged. Four claimants in the Americas, Colombia, Cuba, Panama, and Venezuela, were challenged, while not a single claimant in Oceania was subject to a challenge. According to the “Maritime Claims Reference Manual” mentioned above, several States in Oceania, including Australia,[5] have “excessive maritime claims”. Yet the United States has not challenged a single Oceanian claimant over the past five years. Verification reveals that the last time U.S. FONOPs challenged an Oceanian country dates back to Fiscal Year 2020, when Samoa was targeted.[6]

Second is the “double standard” applied to these operations. Although U.S. FONOPs ostensibly mount objective challenges to the “excessive maritime claims” of various states, their actual targets are highly specific, demonstrating a stark differential treatment between U.S. allies and adversaries.[7] The present report provides a telling example. China has for more than a decade remained the claimant subject to the largest number of challenges. The present report identifies four challenges involving China, placing it alongside Vietnam (also a communist State) as the claimant subject to the greatest number of challenges in Fiscal Year 2025. By contrast, the last time the Philippines, a U.S. ally in Southeast Asia, was subject to a challenge was in Fiscal Year 2018.[8]

Since the Philippines adopted its “Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act” in November 2024, the United States has not challenged the Philippines through a FONOP. In fact, because the Act does not designate all archipelagic sea lanes, some of its provisions would appear to constitute precisely the type of “excessive maritime claim” that the United States purports to challenge.[9][10] Indonesia, by contrast, has repeatedly been subjected to FONOP challenges because its domestic legislation did not designate all of its archipelagic sea lanes.[11] The radically different “treatment” accorded by the United States to identical or similar “excessive maritime claims” depending on its relationship with the country concerned provides compelling evidence of the double-standard nature of its policy.

“Ambiguity” Surrounding the Challenges to China

China has been one of the principal targets of U.S. FONOPs for more than a decade.[12] The 2025 Annual Report identifies four specific “excessive maritime claims” by China challenged during Fiscal Year 2025, together with the relevant maritime areas. All four “excessive maritime claims” are marked with an asterisk symbol (*), indicates “multiple operational challenges” to each claim.

First, China is said to “require prior permission for innocent passage of foreign military ships through the territorial sea”, with the relevant area identified as the South China Sea. This item has appeared in previous editions of annual reports for 11 consecutive years since Fiscal Year 2015 and constitutes the primary target of U.S. challenges to China’s alleged “excessive maritime claims”.

Second, China is said to “claim ‘historic rights’ in the South China Sea”, with the relevant area again identified as the South China Sea. In addition to the asterisk symbol that indicates “multiple operational challenges” to this specific claim, there is also a pound sign (#) that indicates “joint challenge with international partners and allies”. Because the report does not expressly explain what specific claim this challenge refers to, readers can only infer its meaning by comparing previous annual reports. The item appears to encompass, in particular, a claim to territorial seas around certain low-tide elevations in the South China Sea that are “incapable of generating a territorial sea”.

It is worth noting that the precise wording used to describe this alleged “excessive maritime claim” has changed repeatedly in previous annual reports since the “South China Sea Arbitration Award” was rendered on July 12, 2016. The 2017 Annual Report described it as “actions/statements that indicate a claim to a territorial sea around features not so entitled”;[13] the 2018 Annual Report referred to “actions and statements that indicate a claim to a TTS around features not so entitled (i.e., low-tide elevations)”;[14] and the 2019 Annual Report referred to “territorial sea and airspace around features not so entitled (i.e., low-tide elevations). [Actions and statements indicating such a claim.]”.[15] The 2020, 2021, and 2022 Annual Reports changed “indicate” to “imply”, describing the claim as “territorial sea and airspace around features not so entitled (i.e., low-tide elevations). [Actions and statements implying such a claim.]” (2020 Annual Report) [16] and “implied claim to territorial sea and airspace around features not so entitled (i.e., low-tide elevations). [Actions and statements implying such a claim.]”. (2021 and 2022 Annual Report) The three reports issued since the 2023 Annual Report, however, have instead described the alleged claim simply as “claims ‘historic rights’ in the South China Sea”. [17]

Such frequent changes in wording demonstrate the confusion surrounding the United States’ own interpretation of this alleged “excessive maritime claim”. In the end, it appears to have abandoned any specific description altogether and resorted to the broad and ambiguous formulation of “historic rights”. It should be noted that, because the descriptions of this item in the three reports issued since the 2023 Annual Report have been highly ambiguous, and because not all U.S. military operations involving incursions by U.S. warships and aircraft within 12 nautical miles of Chinese maritime features, or into their potential territorial sea and airspace, constitute FONOPs, the precise conduct covered by this particular challenge remains unclear and warrants further observation.

Third, China is said to “require prior approval for military survey activities in the EEZ”, with the relevant area identified as the South China Sea. This item did not appear in the 2024 Annual Report.

Fourth, China is said to “restrict foreign aircraft flying through an Air Defense Identification Zone without intent to enter national airspace”, with the relevant area identified as the East China Sea.

In addition, unlike the 2024 Annual Report, the 2025 Annual Report does not include the item concerning “straight baselines do not conform to international law”.

It should also be noted that seven months have already passed in 2026, yet no publicly available information has mentioned any U.S. FONOP targeting China. This does not necessarily mean that the United States military has conducted no FONOPs against China. Rather, it may simply indicate that the highly publicized “maritime feature-intrusion” type of FONOP, involving U.S. warships entering the (declared or potential) territorial seas of Chinese maritime features, has not occurred. Other types of challenges are, in practice, difficult for the general public to identify.[18]

Conclusion

Ultimately, the release of the U.S. Annual Freedom of Navigation Report for Fiscal Year 2025 marks the continuation of the U.S. military’s FONOPs. On the one hand, the U.S. military itself frequently infringes upon the freedom of navigation of other countries, for example, by striking alleged “drug-trafficking vessels” in the Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean, and by using U.S. domestic law to “capture and detain” foreign vessels on the high seas beyond U.S. jurisdiction,[19] as well as by using disproportional force when exercising its blockade of Iranian ports and coastal areas.[20] On the other hand, the United States continues to portray itself as a “guardian” of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and freedom of navigation, even though it is not a state party to the Convention, while using force to challenge what it considers the “excessive maritime claims” of other States Parties to UNCLOS. In doing so, the United States is determined to carry its maritime hegemony and “double standards” to the extreme.

参考文献

[1] US Department of War, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report (Fiscal Year 2025), Department of War, July 27, 2026, https://policy.war.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FON/Final%20FY25%20FON%20Report.pdf. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[2] US Department of Defense, Summary of Fiscal Year 2024 Operational Challenges, Department of Defense, August 11, 2025, https://policy.war.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FON/TAB%20A%20-%20Summary%20of%20FY24%20Operational%20Challenges.pdf. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[3] US Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser, Digest of United States Practices in International Law, https://www.state.gov/office-of-the-legal-adviser/digest-of-united-states-practice-in-international-law. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[4] US Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Maritime Claims Reference Manual, https://www.jag.navy.mil/about/organization/ojag/code-01/code-10/mcrm. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[5] “Australia: Summary of Claims”, US Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Maritime Claims Reference Manual, April 2019, https://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/5587/Australia2019.pdf. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[6] US Department of Defense, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report (Fiscal Year 2020), January 27, 2021, https://policy.war.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FY20%20DoD%20FON%20Report%20FINAL.pdf. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[7] Kim Heriot-Darragh, “FONOPs send a message – but they don’t speak for themselves”, Lowy Institute, April 24, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/fonops-send-message-they-don-t-speak-themselves. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[8] US Department of Defense, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report (Fiscal Year 2018), February 28, 2019, https://policy.war.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FY18%20DoD%20Annual%20FON%20Report%20(final).pdf. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[9] Liu Xiaobo, “The Influence of the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act on Navigation Rights”, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, April 14, 2024, https://amti.csis.org/the-influence-of-the-philippine-archipelagic-sea-lanes-act-on-navigation-rights. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[10] Dong Shijie, “Which International Rules Does the Philippines’ ‘Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act’ Violate?”, South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative, October 9, 2025, https://scspi.org/en/dtfx/which-international-rules-does-philippines%E2%80%99-%E2%80%9Carchipelagic-sea-lanes-act%E2%80%9D-violate. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[11] Patrick Panjeti, “Navigating the Divide: Why the U.S. Navy Must Resume FONOPs in Indonesia”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 11, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/navigating-divide-why-us-navy-must-resume-fonops-indonesia. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[12] Orange Wang, “China challenges US freedom of navigation operations as having ‘no legal basis’”, South China Morning Post, August 25, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3323104/china-challenges-us-freedom-navigation-operations-having-no-legal-basis. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[13] US Department of Defense, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report (Fiscal Year 2017), November 13, 2017, https://policy.war.gov/Portals/11/FY17%20DOD%20FON%20Report.pdf. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[14] US Department of Defense, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report (Fiscal Year 2018), February 28, 2019, https://policy.war.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FY18%20DoD%20Annual%20FON%20Report%20(final).pdf. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[15] US Department of Defense, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report (Fiscal Year 2019), February 28, 2020, https://policy.war.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FY19%20DoD%20FON%20Report%20FINAL.pdf. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[16] US Department of Defense, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report (Fiscal Year 2020), January 27, 2021, https://policy.war.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FY20%20DoD%20FON%20Report%20FINAL.pdf. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[17] US Department of Defense, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report (Fiscal Year 2023), March 8, 2024, https://policy.war.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FON/DoD%20FON%20Report%20for%20FY23%20(Corrected).pdf. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[18] South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative, An Incomplete Report on US Military Activities in the South China Sea in 2025, June 25, 2026, https://www.scspi.org/sites/default/files/reports/an_incomplete_report_on_us_military_activities_in_the_south_china_sea_in_2025.pdf. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[19] Mu Jiahao, “US Ship Seizure in the Caribbean: A ‘Hybrid Lawfare’”, South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative, February 4, 2026, https://scspi.org/en/dtfx/us-ship-seizure-caribbean-%E2%80%9Chybrid-lawfare%E2%80%9D. Accessed July 28, 2026.

[20] Himanil Raina, “At Peace, Yet Under Fire – Blockade Enforcement against Third State Vessels and the U.N Charter”, EJIL: Talk, July 23, 2026, https://www.ejiltalk.org/at-peace-yet-under-fire-blockade-enforcement-against-third-state-vessels-and-the-u-n-charter. Accessed July 28, 2026.