U.S. Military Base Expansion and Force Posture Enhancement in the Philippines

South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative

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

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With a view to maintaining and promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the South China Sea, we launched the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) in April of 2019. The Initiative aims to integrate intellectual resources and open-source information worldwide and track important actions and major policy changes of key stakeholders and other parties involved. It provides professional data services and analytical reports to parties concerned, helping them manage competition and seek partnerships.

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Preface

Since Ferdinand Marcos Jr.'s inauguration in June 2022, the U.S.-Philippine alliance has strengthened significantly. The number of sites under the *Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement* (EDCA) has surged from five to nine, with the site in northern Luzon facing the Taiwan Strait and the site on Balabac Island approaching the frontline of the Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands). Consequently, the U.S. military presence in the Philippines now has acquired the practical significance of a "forward position on the first island chain". Meanwhile, the scale and intensity of joint exercises such as Balikatan, Salaknib, and KAMANDAG have steadily increased year after year. Systems including the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), the Typhon Weapon System, and the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) have been successively deployed. Through these developments, the U.S. military is progressively incorporating the Philippines into its Indo-Pacific strategic system and command framework.

Nevertheless, the expansion of EDCA bases has fallen short of expectations, and U.S. efforts to strengthen its military presence in the Philippines continue to face constraints from multiple factors. First, the Philippines' own capabilities are limited, providing little assistance to the U.S. in wartime; Second, while the U.S. needs the Philippines' strategic geographic location, it would require significant investment to fully enable the EDCA sites for wartime readiness; Third, the political uncertainty within the Philippines and rising nationalism have added to U.S. hesitations.

Although U.S. forces have sharply increased their presence and deployments in the Philippines, these assets possess limited wartime utility,

especially against a high-end opponent such as China. The main purpose of this strengthened military access is not genuine preparation for war, but rather strategic posturing, containment, and attrition: exploiting the Philippines' geographical advantages to bolster U.S. force posture around the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, shaping a favorable overall strategic environment, and using the Philippines to wear down China during peacetime. At the same time, the U.S. is cautious about making excessive investments in these sites and is wary of turning the Philippines into a wartime forward base.

This report aims to objectively outline and evaluate the expansion of U.S. military sites and other military presences in the Philippines, analyzing their impact on regional security in both peacetime and wartime for the reader's reference and consideration.

Director of SCSPI Hu Bo

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U.S. Military Base Expansion and Force Posture Enhancement in the Philippines

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In March 1947, the U.S. and the Philippines signed the *Military Bases Agreement* (MBA) and the *Military Assistance Agreement* (MAA), granting the U.S. rent-free use of 23 Philippine bases for a period of 99 years. Concurrently, the U.S. provided military funding, weapons and equipment, training, and technical assistance to help the Philippines stabilize its political situation and build its armed forces. In August 1951, the two countries signed the *Mutual Defense Treaty* (MDT), which commits both parties to jointly resist potential external armed attacks, marking the formal establishment of the U.S.-Philippine alliance. In September 1966, the *Ramos-Rusk Agreement* reduced the lease term from 99 years to 25 years. In September 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected a new agreement that would have extended U.S. base rights, forcing the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Philippine bases. Subsequently, the U.S. military maintained a temporary presence and conducted joint training in the Philippines through the *Visiting Forces Agreement* (VFA) and the *Mutual Logistics Support Agreement* (MLSA).

To further expand the U.S. military presence in the Philippines, the EDCA, signed in 2014 as a supplementary agreement to the MDT, permits U.S. forces to conduct training, preposition materiel, and construct infrastructure at Philippine bases. As of May 2026, EDCA encompasses nine bases, with five sites activated in 2016 and four new sites added in 2023. The U.S. military is undertaking infrastructure expansions at Philippine bases to enhance its capacity to support joint exercises and training, through various funding assistance projects. According to incomplete statistics, as of May 2026, the total contract value for U.S. EDCA base expansion projects amounts to approximately $125 million, while the contract value for life support services at all bases in the Philippines is approximately $7.3 million.

In terms of force deployment, in addition to routine rotations, the U.S. has scaled up the deployment of autonomous weapons and unmanned platforms, and live-fire military exercises have increased markedly compared with the period before 2023. Meanwhile, the U.S. is strengthening a multilateral cooperative combat system centered on the strategic axis of the U.S., the Philippines, Japan, and Australia. The overall characteristics demonstrate a strategic shift northward (facing the Taiwan Strait) and an expansion southward (facing the South China Sea), aiming at strengthening the capability to respond to situations in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

1. Base Expansion: From Strategic Access to Forward Presence

The expansion of U.S. military bases in the Philippines is a critical link in America's strategy to implement "Integrated Deterrence" and optimize

the Indo-Pacific pattern. The core objective is to transform the Philippines from a "strategic rear" into a "forward hub". The northern base group is designed to block the Bashi Channel and Balintang Channel during crises and cut off access routes to the Western Pacific; the southern base group strengthens persistent presence and intelligence-collection capabilities in the South China Sea, providing direct support for sea-control operations. In recent years, leveraging the EDCA, the U.S. military has continuously pushed forward infrastructure expansion of military bases in the Philippines to enhance their capacity to support realistic combat-oriented joint drills and maritime cooperation activities.

In March 2016, following the annual Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, the two governments issued a joint statement announcing that, pursuant to the 2014 EDCA, U.S. forces would be granted access to five Philippine military bases. These sites are Basa Air Base in Pampanga, Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, Antonio Bautista Air Base in Palawan, Mactan–Benito Ebuen Air Base in Cebu, and Lumbia Air Base in Cagayan de Oro. In February 2023, the U.S. and the Philippines announced plans that in addition to the previous five bases invested and stationed by U.S. forces, they would establish and operate four additional new bases.[①] In April, the Philippines announced the locations of these four

[①] "Philippines, U.S. Announce Four New EDCA Sites", *U.S. Department of Defense*, February 1, 2023, https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3285566/philippines-us-announce-four-new-edca-sites/

additional sites: Naval Base Camilo Osias and Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan, Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Isabela, and Balabac Island in Palawan.[①]

Figure 1: U.S.-Philippine EDCA Locations

1.1 Basa Air Base

Basa Air Base, located in Pampanga Province on the Luzon Island, has received the largest share of U.S. infrastructure improvement funding among the nine sites. In November 2023, a renovation project for the 2,800-meter runway was completed, costing approximately $25 million.[②] Subsequently, in July 2024, the U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific (NAVFAC Pacific) awarded a $32 million contract to Acciona CMS Philippines LLC. This contract provides for the construction of an approximately 54,000-square-meter apron (which is capable of accommodating 20 aircraft), shoulders and taxiways. The project is

[①] "Philippines, U.S. Announce Locations of Four New EDCA Sites", *U.S. Department of Defense*, April 3, 2023, https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3349257/philippines-us-announce-locations-of-four-new-edca-sites/

[②] "U.S., Philippines Complete Largest EDCA Project to Date", *USNI News*, November 6, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/11/06/u-s-philippines-complete-largest-edca-project-to-date

expected to be completed by July 2026. [1]Furthermore, the U.S. military has conducted repairs on other facilities at the base, including the operations center and barracks.

Figure 2: Comparison of Basa Air Base imagery (2023 vs 2026)

1.2 Fort Magsaysay

Fort Magsaysay serves as a vital staging area and command-and-control center for numerous training activities, including the annual

[1] "U.S. Funding $32M Upgrade to Air Base in the Philippines", *USNI News*, August 9, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/08/09/u-s-funding-32m-upgrade-to-air-base-in-the-philippines

Balikatan. It also functions as a combined arms joint training platform for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force alongside the Philippine Army. In 2024, projects such as the simulation training center, the vehicle maintenance and covered training area, and the live-fire range renovation were initiated. Subsequently, in March 2025, as part of Exercise Salaknib, the U.S. 84th Engineer Battalion collaborated with the Philippine Army's 522nd Construction Battalion to upgrade a road of approximately 792 meters. This project entailed road reinforcement and drainage system optimization designed to facilitate the passage of heavy-duty military vehicles.[①]

Figure 3 Comparison of Fort Magsaysay imagery (2023 vs 2026)

[①] "Salaknib 25: U.S. and Philippine engineers construction projects and build bonds", *U.S. Army*, May 5, 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/285234/salaknib_25_us_and_philippine_engineers_construction_projects_and_build_bonds

1.3 Antonio Bautista Air Base

Antonio Bautista Air Base is located in Puerto Princesa, Palawan Island, and shares a 2,600-meter runway with Puerto Princesa International Airport. Among the nine EDCA bases, it is the closest to the Nansha Islands (only 160 nautical miles away), facilitating responses to emergencies in disputed areas. The U.S. military has constructed infrastructure at the base, including ammunition depots, fuel storage facilities, and command-and-control centers. In June 2025, Acciona CMS Philippines LLC was responsible for the ground fuel tank repair and design project. In May 2026, the U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Command Far East (NAVFAC Far East) issued a presolicitation contract opportunity to repair the aboveground fuel storage facilities at the air base, with formal solicitation documents expected to be released between June and July 2026.[①]

[①] "DBB UFC Repair Aboveground Fuel Storage, ABAB, PHL", *SAM.gov*, May 6, 2026, https://news.usni.org/2026/05/20/u-s-wants-to-construct-philippine-coast-guard-maintenance-facility-repair-fuel-depot-in-palawan

Figure 4 Comparison of Antonio Bautista Air Base imagery (2023 vs 2026)

1.4 Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base

Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base is located on Mactan Island, Cebu Province, and shares runways with Mactan-Cebu International Airport (MCIA). In September 2021, the U.S. invested $2.46 million to construct a fuel storage facility at the base with a capacity of approximately 40,000 gallons (151,000 liters), which was undertaken by Himalayan Builders and Engineers Pvt. Ltd. The facility is intended to enhance the operational and humanitarian aid capabilities of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) in the Visayas region. The project was completed in September 2024 and

operated in January 2025.[1] In September 2025, the NAVFAC Pacific awarded a construction contract valued at $9.1996 million to RORE, INC. Covering the development of maintenance, operational and multi-purpose warehouse facilities, the deal is designed to bolster the bases' logistical storage, maintenance and operational capacities, so as to underpin joint U.S.-Philippine military activities.

Figure 5 Comparison of Mactan–Benito Ebuen Air Base imagery (2023 vs 2026)

[1] "PH, U.S. Air Forces inaugurate EDCA fuel storage facility in Cebu", *Philippine News Agency*, January 30, 2025, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1242980

1.5 Lumbia Air Base

Lumbia Air Base is located in Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental Province, on the southern shore of the Bohol Sea. It serves as the home base for the PAF 15th Strike Wing, which is primarily equipped with the OV-10 Bronco light attack aircraft, UH-1 Huey helicopters, MD-520MG Defender tactical helicopters and others. In 2024, the Philippines undertook renovations at the base, including barracks, parking areas, ammunition depot roads, and taxiways. In July 2025, Lumbia Air Base inaugurated a new accommodation facility with a capacity for over 1,000 soldiers.[①] In September 2025, RORE, INC. was tasked with constructing multi-purpose warehouses at the base, with the project scheduled for completion in April 2027.

Figure 6 Comparison of Lumbia Air Base imagery (2023 vs 2026)

[①] "Lumbia Airbase opens new billeting facilities", *Gold Star Daily News*, July 12, 2025, https://mindanao goldstardaily.com/archives/151192

1.6 Naval Base Camilo Osias

Naval Base Camilo Osias is located in Santa Ana, Cagayan Province, approximately 400 kilometers northwest of Cape Eluanbi, Taiwan. The base is equipped with new naval ships, unmanned combat systems, small patrol vessels, and auxiliary vessels. It includes a command-and-control center to support operational coordination and joint military operations. The U.S. has committed to providing funding for the upgrade of Camilo Osias Naval Base. Planned construction includes a new pier, runway repair, a command-and-control integration system, a dining facility, and a Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR) warehouse, all intended to support broader military and humanitarian missions. However, the infrastructure expansion progress at the base currently appears to be limited.

Figure 7 Comparison of Naval Base Camilo Osias imagery (2022 vs 2026)

1.7 Lal-lo Airport

Lal-lo Airport, located in Lal-lo, Cagayan Province, and is utilized by the PAF, with equipment including UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. The airport features a runway measuring 2,100 meters in length and 45 meters in width, which complies with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and is capable of accommodating fewer than 100 commercial as well as military aircraft such as the C-130 and CH-47F. Since its inclusion in the EDCA list, official details regarding the base's expansion have not been disclosed. However, based on remote sensing imagery, expansions to the aprons and building facilities have been observed.

Figure 8 Comparison of Lal-lo Airport imagery (2022 vs 2026)

1.8 Camp Melchor Dela Cruz

Camp Melchor Dela Cruz serves as the headquarters for the Philippine Army's 5th Infantry Division and is equipped with standard Philippine Army assets, including infantry weapons, vehicles, and communication systems. In April 2025, the NAVFAC Pacific awarded Sea Pac Engineering, Inc. a $1.26 million contract. The project entailed designing and building a single-story Command and Control Fusion Center (C2FC) of approximately 450 square meters at Camp Melchor Dela Cruz, with completion anticipated in July 2026.[①] In July of the same year, GHD INC. was contracted to undertake a road network planning project.

Figure 9 Comparison of Camp Melchor Dela Cruz imagery (2022 vs 2026)

① *USA SPENDING.gov*, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_N6274225F0136_9700_N6274225D1337_9700

1.9 Balabac Island

Balabac Island is the southernmost island of Palawan Province, bordering the South China Sea to the west and facing Sabah, Malaysia, across the Balabac Strait to the south. The base is utilized by the PAF and the Philippine Navy (PN), with equipment including the UH-60 Black Hawk and Bell 412 helicopters, primarily employed for sea patrol and HADR missions. The Philippines initiated the construction of the air base in 2019, covering a total area of approximately 300 hectares. This development was jointly advanced by the Philippine Department of National Defense (DND) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), coordinating with the 2023 EDCA base expansion list. Among these efforts, the construction of the 3,000-meter military runway, jointly managed by the DND and DPWH, is executed by the contractor One Hundred Percent Construction and Development Corp. The Philippine President Marcos stated in July 2024 that the runway construction had entered its final phase.[①] As of May 2026, this military runway has not yet been officially put into service.

[①] "Balabac Island's EDCA military runway nears completion", *The Philippine Star*, July 19, 2024, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2024/07/19/2371372/balabac-islands-edca-military-runway-nears-completion

Figure 10 Comparison of Balabac Island imagery (2023 vs 2026)

In addition to the nine military bases mentioned, the U.S. military is authorized to temporarily use non-EDCA military bases, ports, and facilities in the Philippines for exercises, resupply, and humanitarian operations through agreements such as the VFA and the MLSA. For instance, U.S. Air Force P-8A anti-submarine patrol aircraft and MQ-9 are routinely and rotationally deployed to Clark Air Base to conduct reconnaissance missions in the South China Sea. Subic Bay, in particular, serves as a crucial supply hub for the U.S. along the coast of the South China Sea.

Furthermore, in June 2025, according to the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense report accompanying the *Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026*, to address the shortfall in forward ammunition production capacity in the Indo-Pacific region, the committee directed the Department of Defense (DOD), in coordination with the Department of State and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, to evaluate the establishment of a joint ammunition manufacturing and storage facility at Subic Bay.[①] In September 2025, the NAVFAC Pacific issued Request for Lease Proposal (RLP LI-14305), seeking to lease approximately 25,778 m^2 of Climate Controlled Warehouse, Maintenance Shop, Exterior Laydown and Parking Areas in

[①] "Congress Eyes Ammunition Plant at former U.S. Naval Base in the Philippines", *USNI News*, June 24, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/06/24/congress-eyes-ammunition-plant-at-former-u-s-naval-base-in-the-philippines

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Freeport Area, Republic of the Philippines. The facility is intended for U.S. military vehicle and equipment storage and maintenance (excluding ammunition), with a 5-year lease term. The site must be located inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone and within 16 kilometers of the Naval Supply Depot to support rapid deployment requirements under EDCA.[①] In April 2026, the U.S. military unveiled plans to establish a Defense Fuel Support Point (DFSP) in the Davao area of Mindanao in southern Philippines by 2028, aiming to bolster forward resupply capabilities across the Western Pacific.[②]

[①] "Request for Lease Proposal (RLP) LI-14305 of Approximately 25,778 Square Meters of Climate Controlled Warehouse and Maintenance Shop, Exterior Laydown and Parking Areas in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority Freeport Area Republic of the Philippines." *SAM.gov*, https://sam.gov/workspace/contract/opp/ff4a6a3561504eebb3f051882a83399d/view

[②] "Pentagon Adds to Pacific Refueling Capacity With New Philippine Depot", *USNI News*, April 7, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2026/04/07/pentagon-adds-to-pacific-refueling-capacity-with-new-philippine-depot

2. Force Deployment: From Rotational to Combat-Ready Military System

The characteristics of U.S. force deployments in the Philippines have undergone three major shifts: from intermittent exercise-based presence to sustained rotational deployments; from single-service operations to integrated joint operations; and from bilateral cooperation to multilateral alliance coordination. The U.S. military presence in the Philippines has already gone beyond the traditional scope of alliance cooperation, evolving into a fully functional, rapidly responsive, and tightly coordinated, combat-ready military system integrated with multilateral alliances. At present, the U.S. deployment in the Philippines "has effectively become equivalent to maintaining a permanent military presence" in the country.[①]

2.1 Composition of Military Forces

Beyond logistics and base-maintenance personnel, the U.S. forces stationed in the Philippines on a regularized basis consist primarily of units designed to operate in conjunction with autonomous weapons systems, such as the 25th Infantry Division, the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, and the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment. Through rotational deployments, the U.S.

[①] "A narrow Pacific waterway is at the heart of U.S. plans to choke China's vast navy", *Reuters*, October 31, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/investigations/narrow-pacific-waterway-is-heart-us-plans-choke-chinas-vast-navy-2025-10-31/

can rapidly mobilize ground troops, marine corps, and air forces to participate in joint exercises such as Balikatan and Salaknib.

The U.S. Army has regarded northern Luzon–the Batanes Islands as its strategic axis in the Philippines, with a primary focus on deploying the HIMARS. The units involved are mainly drawn from the U.S. 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force. In May 2025, Ben Blane, commander of the 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment under the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, stated in an interview during Balikatan 2025 that HIMARS units had maintained a rotational presence in the Philippines since 2022. [①]This marked the first time the U.S. military publicly referred to such deployments as "rotational forces", rather than merely "temporary exercise deployments", signalling a shift from exercise-based temporary stationing to permanent regular military presence. From April 20 to May 8, 2026, the U.S.-Philippines-led Balikatan 2026 joint military exercise was conducted in northern Luzon, Palawan, the Batanes Islands, and other areas of the Philippines. Troops from Canada, France and New Zealand officially participated in the drills for the first time. The HIMARS assigned to the 25th Infantry Division was deployed on Itbayat Island of the Batanes Islands to demonstrate rapid infiltration of long-range missile systems into

[①] "U.S. Army HIMARS unit deepens Philippines presence during South China Sea tensions", *Stars and S tripes*, May 12, 2025, https://www.stripes.com/branches/army/2025-05-12/army-himars-philippines-china-sea-17763184.html#

remote locations.[①]

In March 2025, the U.S. Marine Corps launched a new rotation mechanism in northern Luzon, Littoral Rotational Force–Luzon (LRF–Luzon), with the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment conducting regular rotational deployments.[②] Focusing on northern Luzon, the Batanes Islands, and Palawan Island, the force conducted exercises centered on Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept. The rotation model commenced in March 2025, with the first cycle concluding in September, and a six-month rotation schedule was designed to ensure sustained operational readiness. In April 2025, the NMESIS conducted its first deployment in the Philippines, integrating it with the HIMARS system to form a distributed fires network. The U.S. Marine Corps maintained rotational deployments in the Philippines and further integrated with Philippine military forces. In March 2026, the U.S. Marine Corps issued a statement announcing the extension of the deployment period for the Marine Rotational Force – Southeast Asia (MRF-SEA) in the Philippines, aiming to deepen bilateral military integration and enhance joint operational capabilities. This extension broke from the unit's conventional rotational deployment model and marked a shift in U.S. military

① "U.S. Missiles Deploy Near Taiwan During Balikatan Exercise, Chinese Action Group Operates Nearby", *USNI News*, April 28, 2026, https://news.usni.org/2026/04/28/u-s-missiles-deploy-near-taiwan-during-balikatan-exercise-chinese-action-group-operates-nearby

② "Marine Corps to Debut New Philippine Rotational Force at Balikatan 2025 Drills", *USNI News*, March 27, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/03/27/marine-corps-to-debut-new-philippine-rotational-force-at-balikatan-2025-drills

deployment strategy from a simple troop presence to a mission-oriented forward presence.[①]

The U.S. Air Force's rotational presence in the Philippines primarily focuses on temporary exercise support rather than a fixed "rotational force" model, with activities coordinated mainly through Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) centered on Clark Air Base. In recent years, the U.S. military—including the Air Force and other services—has deployed F-22A, F-35, F-16, F/A-18, A-10C, MV-22, CV-22, C-130 and other aircraft to the Philippines through rotations and joint exercises, while P-8A and MQ-9 platforms have been regularly employed to enhance air supremacy, maritime strike, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. In July 2025, as part of the "Cope Thunder 25-2" exercise, the U.S. Air Force deployed F-35A fighters to Clark Air Base for the first time.[②] During the Balikatan 2026, the 317th Airlift Wing of the U.S. Air Force deployed C-130J Super Hercules aircraft to carry out specialized fuel resupply, rapid infiltration delivery and long-range fire support missions.[③] Additionally, the U.S. military contracts defense firms to operate modified Beechcraft Super King Air 350 reconnaissance aircraft and other "non-

① "U.S. Marine Force Southeast Asia Lingers Longer in the Philippines", *USNI News*, April 3, 2026, https://news.usni.org/2026/04/03/u-s-marine-force-southeast-asia-lingers-longer-in-the-philippines

② "U.S. Air Force conducts first-ever deployment of F-35 fighter jets in Philippines as response to Chinese naval incursions", *Army Recognition*, July 16, 2025, https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/us-air-force-conducts-first-ever-deployment-of-f-35-fighter-jets-in-philippines-as-response-to-chinese-naval-incursions

③ "Balikatan 2026: 317th AW conducts MEO, arrives in Philippines", *U.S. Air Force*, April 26, 2026, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4466910/balikatan-2026-317th-aw-conducts-meo-arrives-in-philippines/

standard" aircraft from Philippine airfields to conduct ISR missions over the South China Sea.

2.2 Deployment Status of Core Equipment

In parallel with the expansion of base infrastructure, U.S. equipment deployments in the Philippines have progressed from symbolic presence to combat-oriented and systematized pattern, with the introduction of key offensive weapon systems drawing particular attention.

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System（HIMARS）: Since its first live-fire demonstration in 2016, HIMARS has become the central firepower platform of U.S.–Philippine joint exercises, evolving from "technology display" to a tool of operationalization of island chain denial. It has participated in exercises such as Balikatan, Salaknib, and Maritime Warrior. As a mature multi-domain warfare asset, HIMARS has been regularly integrated into rotational deployments to provide short-range precision fire support, with deployment frequency increasing from once per year to five times in 2025. On 30 June 2025, the U.S. Army's 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, together with the Philippine Army Artillery Regiment, conducted a HIMARS live-fire exercise at Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation, launching 21 reduced-range GMLRS training rockets.[①] On

[①] "U.S. & Philippine Forces Partner for HIMARS Live-Fire Exercise", *DVIDS*, July 1, 2025, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/502071/us-philippine-forces-partner-himars-live-fire-exercise

April 16, 2026, as part of Exercise Salaknib 2026, U.S. and Philippine troops conducted joint HIMARS live-fire exercises. Officers and soldiers of the Philippine Army Artillery Regiment took part in the training to enhance joint land combat capabilities.[①] In addition, HIMARS live-fire drills were also conducted during Balikatan 2026. The HIMARS systems were employed in coordination with mortars, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, Javelin anti-tank missiles, TOW anti-tank missiles and direct-fire weapons to establish a multi-layered integrated defensive firepower system.[②]

Typhon Weapon System: First deployed to the Philippines in April 2024, the Typhon system, which is capable of med-range precision strikes, has been retained on Luzon indefinitely. The system can launch Tomahawk cruise missiles with ranges exceeding 1,600 kilometers and SM-6 missiles with a range of roughly 500 kilometers, theoretically enabling strikes against targets deep within China's southeastern coast. It is a critical component of land-based capability. In February 2025, the Typhon system was employed during the Katihan combined-arms training exercise.[③] In May, Philippine Army spokesman Louie Dema-ala said that it would

① "PH, U.S. armies fire HIMARS at Salaknib drills", *ABS-CBN News*, April 16, 2026, https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/nation/2026/4/16/ph-us-armies-fire-himars-at-salaknib-drills-1500
② "U.S. Army HIMARS Live-Fire Exercise in Philippines Reinforces Emerging Archipelagic Coastal Defense Strategy", *Army Recognition*, April 27, 2026, https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2026/u-s-army-himars-live-fire-exercises-in-philippines-reinforce-emerging-archipelagic-coastal-defense-strategy
③ "Philippine Soldiers to train with U.S. personnel on Typhon missile system", *Indo-Pacific Defense Forum*, February 9, 2025, https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/02/philippine-soldiers-to-train-with-u-s-personnel-on-typhon-missile-system/

welcome additional U.S. Typhon missile systems.[①] In February 2026, the U.S. announced plans to deploy additional Mid-Range Capability Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, further expanding the forward deployment posture initially established in northern Luzon since April 2024.[②]

The Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS): In April 2025, the U.S. Marine Corps deployed the NMESIS anti-ship missile system to the Philippines for the first time to support the Balikatan 2025 exercise. The Naval Strike Missile (NSM), launched from the system and possessing a range of 185 kilometers, is designed specifically for anti-ship operations and is employed through distributed deployment and multi-domain integration to help impose closure on the Luzon Strait. On May 26, 2025, during the launch of the KAMANDAG 9 exercise involving the U.S., the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and the U.K., the NMESIS operated in coordination with HIMARS and the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS), marking the first operationalized deployment of NMESIS and the first blockade simulation of the Luzon

① "Philippines says more U.S. Typhon missiles 'very welcome' despite China's warnings", *South China Morning Post*, June 17, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3314817/philippines-says-more-us-typhon-missiles-very-welcome-despite-chinas-warnings

② "U.S. to Deploy Additional Typhon Missile Systems to Philippines in 2026", *Army Recognition*, Feb 18, 2026, https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2026/u-s-to-deploy-additional-typhon-missile-systems-to-philippines-in-2026

Strait.[①] On June 10, the Philippine Navy announced that the NMESIS would remain in the Philippines "for training purposes".[②] The combined employment of NMESIS and HIMARS establishes an echeloned fires network covering the Luzon Strait – Bashi Channel – Taiwan Strait, transforming the First Island Chain from a "geographical barrier" into a "fire kill chain", and signaling the evolution of the U.S. concept of distributed lethality from theory to operational practice.

Additionally, through rotational and temporary deployment mechanisms, the U.S. military has stationed in the Philippines a range of advanced systems, including the MADIS, anti-drone systems, unmanned combat systems, 3D-printed drone equipment, and cyber warfare equipment. These assets are primarily intended to strengthen the U.S. distributed denial capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region and to alleviate the strategic anxiety arising from the quantitative limitations of major platforms in the South China Sea and surrounding areas.

2.3 Joint Exercises and Drill: Enhancing Multilateral Coordination

In recent years, the scale and frequency of bilateral and multilateral exercises between the U.S. and the Philippines have increased significantly,

[①] "Multinational forces set to launch KAMANDAG 9 in the Philippines", *DVIDS*, May 3, 2025, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/496931/multinational-forces-set-launch-kamandag-9-philippines#:~:text=PUERTO%20PRINCESA%2C%20Philippines%20%E2%80%94%20Service%20members%20from%20the,multinational%20military%20readiness%2C%20interoperability%2C%20and%20regional%20defense%20capabilities.
[②] "U.S. anti-ship missile platform still in PH", *Philippine News Agency*, June 10, 2025, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1251841

with an annual growth of approximately 30%. In 2025, the U.S. military and the Philippines conducted a cumulative total of more than 500 joint exercises and training activities. In addition to joint exercises, the U.S. and the Philippines organize a large number of joint training activities each year to enhance military interoperability, focusing on improving the capabilities of both forces to conduct “maritime guerrilla warfare” operations in the South China Sea. In 2026, the two countries have conducted a total of 10 joint exercises, including 4 bilateral exercises and 6 multilateral exercises. Among them, the Balikatan 2026 was the largest in scale, with approximately 17,000 troops participating. This represents the largest Balikatan exercise in history.

Bilateral and multilateral exercises between the two countries have been increasingly inclined towards combat-ready drills. The exercise subjects have evolved from conventional defense to high-intensity confrontation simulations, primarily focusing on core operational scenarios such as island seizure, strait blockade, and amphibious landing. In locations such as the Batanes Islands, the two armies have conducted simulated use of HIMARS, NMESIS to launch long-range precision strikes against maritime targets, thereby continuously refining the operational procedures of forward fire bases. Amid concerns over so-called “gray-zone” competition, from May 22 to June 6, 2025, U.S. and Philippine forces

conducted a two-week joint amphibious exercise in Tawi-Tawi Province near the Sulu-Celebes Passage. The exercise involved the Philippine Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Special Operations Forces, Maritime Police, and more than 200 elite U.S. personnel. Activities included live-fire maritime engagements, amphibious assaults, and visit-board-search-and-seizure simulations in the vicinity of the coastal towns of Panglima Sugala and Simunul.[①] This marked the first time that an annual exercise was held at the southernmost tip of the Philippines, reflecting heightened U.S.-Philippine concerns over regional security. In addition, through live-fire drills, long-range fire strikes, amphibious operations, unmanned system operations and joint maritime exercises carried out in sensitive waters such as the Bashi Channel and adjacent areas of the South China Sea during Balikatan 2026, the two militaries have substantially improved their combat capabilities in addressing non-traditional conflicts, ambiguous confrontations and gray-zone security challenges. This move continues the regional security focus embodied by the southern coastal amphibious exercises held in Tawi-Tawi in 2025.

The U.S. and the Philippines continue to deepen and broaden their military cooperation mechanisms. Following the signing of the *General Security of Military Information Agreement* (GSOMIA) in November 2024,

[①] "PH, U.S. troops wrap up war games in strategic Tawi-Tawi waters", *Rappler*, June 10, 2025, https://www.rappler.com/philippines/mindanao/united-states-war-games-tawi-tawi-june-2025/

the U.S. has acknowledged the establishment of a roughly 15-person "Second Thomas Shoal Task Force" in the Philippines, which supports Philippine intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) as well as situational awareness.[①] In October 2025, the two countries announced the establishment of a permanent "Philippine Task Force" on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Comprising approximately 60 personnel and led by a U.S. one-star general permanently stationed in the Philippines, the task force was responsible for coordinating bilateral activities in the South China Sea, including joint patrols, real-time intelligence sharing, and crisis response.[②] This marked the first standing joint command structure between the U.S. and the Philippines, designed to enhance bilateral coordination, joint planning, and interoperability in the South China Sea and surrounding areas.

In addition, the U.S. has actively supported its allies in concluding *Status of Visiting Forces Agreements* (SOVFA) with the Philippines. On April 30, 2025, New Zealand and the Philippines signed a SOVFA to improve interoperability through joint training, exercises, and

[①] Hu Bo, "Fact and Fiction: The U.S. Military's Growing Presence in the Philippines," *Modern Ships*, No. 12, 2025.
[②] "U.S. Unveils Philippine Task Force to Deter Chinese Coercion", *USNI News*, October 31, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/10/31/u-s-unveils-philippine-task-force-to-deter-chinese-coercion

humanitarian assistance.[①] On November 2, 2025, Canada and the Philippines signed a similar SOVFA, permitting Canadian forces access to Philippine territory, ports, and bases for joint training, intelligence sharing, and potential equipment deployment.[②]

Joint U.S.-Philippine maritime patrols remain a centerpiece of bilateral military cooperation. From 2025 to May 2026, U.S.-Philippine *Maritime Cooperative Activities* (MCA) have grown increasingly regularized and combat-oriented. In 2025, such activities reached a high frequency of six sessions with high-level participation including aircraft carrier strike groups, covering carrier operations, anti-submarine patrols, littoral maneuver and other fields, and maintained steady momentum in early 2026. These activities represent in-depth implementation under the EDCA, and reflect strengthened strategic coordination between the two sides in response to regional maritime tensions, forming a new normal of bilateral MCA featuring high frequency, small scale, diversification and sustainability.

[①] "Philippines signs military pact with New Zealand to widen alliances while facing an assertive China", *AP New*, April 30, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/new-zealand-philippines-status-of-visiting-forces-agreement-b695ff83f5021e1569b2245229dfe4d3

[②] "Canada and the Philippines Sign a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement", *Government of Canada*, November 2, 2025, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2025/11/canada-and-the-philippines-sign-a-status-of-visiting-forces-agreement.html

Table 1: U.S.–Philippines MCA since 2023

NO.	Date	Participant	Force
1	2023.11.21-23	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Gabrielle Giffords, P-8A Philippines: BPR Conrado Yap, BRP Jose Rizal, BRP Gregorio del Pilar, FA-50PH, A-29B
2	2024.01.03-04	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Carl Vinson, USS Princeton, USS Kidd, USS Sterett Philippines: BRP Gregorio del Pilar, BRP Ramon Alcaraz, BRP Davao del Sur, AW-159
3	2024.02.09	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Gabrielle Giffords, MH-60S Philippines: BRP Gregorio del Pilar, AW-109
4	2024.07.31	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Mobile Philippines: BRP Ramon Alcaraz
5	2025.01.17-18	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Carl Vinson, USS Princeton, USS Kidd, USS Sterett, MH-60, V-22, F/A-18 Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Andres Bonifacio, FA-50
6	2025.05.20	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USCGC Stratton Philippines: BRP Ramon Alcaraz, BRP Domingo De Luana, BRP Melchora Aquino, BRP Malapascua, AW-109
7	2025.06.04	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment Philippines: BRP Miguel Malvar
8	2025.07.16	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Curtis Wilbur, P-8A Philippines: BRP Miguel Malvar, BRP Cabra, BRP Suluan
9	2025.12.9-10	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Rafael Peralta, P-8A, MH-60R Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal, 3*FA-50, 3*A-29B
10	2025.12.15	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Robert Smalls, P-8A, MH-60R Philippines: BRP Miguel Malvar, 3*A-29B, 3*FA-50
11	2026.1.25-26	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS John Finn, MH-60R Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Gabriela Silang, FA-50PH, A-29, AW-109
12	2026.3.20	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Blue Ridge Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Gabriela Silang, A-29B, C-208B
13	2026.5.26-30	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USCGC Midgett, MH-65 Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Melchora Aquino, AW-109

Multinational cooperative operations have deepened. The U.S. military has used EDCA bases as a springboard to conduct joint anti-

submarine warfare, air defense, and at-sea replenishment, and other advanced training with the armed forces of the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Canada, and additional partners, steadily driving deeper integration of a multilateral operational framework. Throughout 2025, the U.S. and the Philippines staged at least 15 multilateral exercises. These were centered on the core U.S.-Philippines-Japan-Australia quadrilateral while incorporating up to 19 countries—including Canada, France, the UK, New Zealand, and others—as observers or supporting participants, thereby establishing a tiered "core four + extended partners" cooperation system. In April 2025, Japan took part in Balikatan 2025 as an official participant for the first time. The drill involved around 14,000 troops, and the number of observer nations also increased from 14 in 2024 to 19, with new European participants including the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Poland.[①] This exercise markedly broadened regional and extra-regional involvement and, for the first time, featured the live deployment of the NMESIS land-based anti-ship missile system operating in concert with HIMARS rocket artillery and unmanned surface vessels to simulate complex multilateral maritime strike scenarios. The Balikatan 2026 involved seven participating countries, namely the U.S., the Philippines, Australia, Japan, Canada, France and New Zealand. The

[①] "Philippines and U.S. kick off Balikatan 2025 large-scale exercise", *Naval News*, April 22, 2025, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/04/philippines-and-u-s-kick-off-balikatan-2025-large-scale-exercise/

exercise aimed to strengthen the interoperability of multinational forces in regional security maintenance, crisis response and joint operations across the Indo-Pacific region. Concurrently, the U.S. and the Philippines intensified joint and multilateral maritime patrols with Japan, Australia and other countries. From 2025 to May 2026, the U.S. and the Philippines conducted 11 *Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activities* (MMCA) in the South China Sea—six more than in 2024.

Table 2: U.S.–Philippines MMCA since 2024

NO.	Date	Participant	Force
1	2024.04.07	U.S., Japan, Australia, Philippines	U.S.: USS Mobile, P-8A Japan: JS Akebono Australia: HMAS Warramunga, P-8A Philippines： BRP Gregorio del Pilar, BRP Ramon Alcaraz
2	2024.06.16-17	U.S., Japan, Canada, Philippines	U.S.: USS Ralph Johnson, P-8A Japan: JS Kirisame Canada: HMCS Montreal Philippines: BRP Andres Bonifacio
3	2024.08.07-08	U.S., Australia, Canada, Philippines	U.S.: USS Lake Erie Australia: P-8A Canada: HMCS Montreal Philippines: BRP Ramon Alcaraz, BRP Jose Rizal
4	2024.09.28	U.S., Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines	U.S.: USS Howard Australia: HMAS Sydney Japan: JS Sazanami New Zealand: HMNZS Aotearoa Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Emilio Jacinto
5	2024.12.06	U.S., Japan, Philippines	U.S.: P-8A Japan: JS Samidare Philippines: BRP Andres Bonifacio, C-90
6	2025.02.05	U.S., Japan, Australia, Philippines	Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal Australia: HMAS Hobart and P-8A Japan: JS Akizuki U.S.: USS Benfold and P-8A

7	2025.02.12	U.S., Canada, Philippines	U.S.: USS Benfold, P-8A Philippines: BRP Andrés Bonifacio Canada: HMCS Ottawa
8	2025.03.28	U.S., Japan, Philippines	U.S.: USS Shoup, P-8A Japan: JS Noshiro Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal, C-90
9	2025.04.29	U.S., Australia, Philippines	U.S.: F-16 and F-18 Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, AW-159, FA-50 Australia: HMAS Sydney
10	2025.09.02-03	U.S., Australia, Canada, Philippines	U.S.: P-8A Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal, AW-159, C-208B Australia: HMAS Brisbane, P-8A Canada: HMCS Ville de Quebéc, CH-148
11	2025.09.12-13	U.S., Japan, Philippines	U.S.: USS John Finn, P-8A, MH-60R Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal, AW-109, C-208B, FA-50 Japan: JS Osumi
12	2025.10.30-31	U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Philippines	U.S.: USS Fitzgerald Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal, AW-109, C-208B, A-29B Australia: HMAS Ballarat, MH-60R New Zealand: HMNZS Aotearoa
13	2025.11.14	U.S., Japan, Philippines	U.S.: USS Nimitz, USS Wayne Meyer, USS Gridley, USS Lenah Sutcliffe Higbee Japan: JS Akebono, SH-60K Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal, BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Melchora Aquino, BRP Cape San Agustin, AW-159
14	2026.2.15-16	U.S., Australia, Philippines	U.S.: USS Dewey, P-8A Philippines: BRP Diego Silang, BRP Teresa Magbanua, AW-109, FA-50, A-29, C-208B Australia: HMAS Towoomba, P-8A
15	2026.2.20-26	U.S., Japan, Philippines	U.S.: USS Dewey, P-8A Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, 2*FA-50 Japan: P-3C
16	2026.4.9-12	U.S., Australia, Philippines	U.S.: USS Ashland Philippines: BRP Rajah Sulayman, AW-109, FA-50, A-29B, C-208B Australia: HMAS Toowoomba, MH-60R, P-8A

3. Future Trends and Influencing Factors

For a long time, the U.S. and the Philippines have continuously deepened and broadened their bilateral alliance underpinned by agreements including MBA, MDT and EDCA. The fundamental drivers of progress in U.S.-Philippines relations are U.S. strategic competition with China and the Philippines' strategy of deterring China. The U.S. exploits the Philippines to stir tension in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, while the Philippines seeks to leverage U.S. power and capitalize on its geographic advantages to strengthen its own capabilities, conduct infringements and provocations in the South China Sea, and expand its international influence. However, constrained by domestic politics in both countries and different national interests, U.S. military deployments in the Philippines tend to follow a "light-asset" approach, avoiding excessive investment.

3.1 The Philippines' Limited National Strength Offers Minimal Support to the U.S.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines face multiple constraints, including insufficient budgets, outdated equipment, and a slow modernization process, which severely limit their actual military contribution to the U.S.-Philippine alliance. In the *General Appropriations*

Act, FY 2025 released by the Marcos Jr. administration, the DND was allocated 271.9 billion pesos (approximately $4.65 billion), of which the Army received 138.2 billion pesos, the Air Force 51.6 billion pesos, and the Navy 51.0 billion pesos.[①] In 2026, the defense budget rose to approximately 305.9 billion pesos, an increase of 33.9 billion pesos or 12.5% year-on-year, with funding clearly tilted toward naval and air forces.[②] However, this growth has not fundamentally altered the weak foundational reality of Philippine military development. Military modernization spending remains below the armed forces' long-term actual requirements, while the pace of equipment renewal, system integration, and capability building continues to be slow, resulting in only limited improvement in overall combat support capabilities.

A Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report points out that the Philippines' military contribution is extremely limited: its armed forces are progressing slowly in modernization and in shifting from internal security to territorial defense; its logistics, military innovation, and defense industry are weak; it cannot provide effective support in high-intensity, multi-domain conflicts; and it can only offer limited logistical assistance

① "GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, FY 2025", *Department of Budget and Management of the Republic of the Philippines*, https://www.dbm.gov.ph/index.php/management-2/3156-pbbm-signs-2025-general-appropriations-act

② "GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, FY 2026", *Department of Budget and Management of the Republic of the Philippines*, https://www.dbm.gov.ph/index.php/2026/general-appropriations-act-gaa-fy-2026

to U.S. forces stationed in the Philippines.[①] The Philippines also has limited wartime logistical support capacity in the Indo-Pacific region—73% of its petroleum products are imported and highly vulnerable to supply disruptions in a conflict environment—making it unable to meet the large-scale, sustained operational logistics demands of U.S. forces.[②]

These limitations mean that, despite its geographic and strategic value, the Philippines provides only marginal military assistance and falls far short of meeting U.S. wartime logistics requirements, thereby weakening the overall effectiveness of the alliance.

3.2 The U.S. Hesitancy over the Wartime Utility of EDCA Bases

The limited wartime utility of Philippine EDCA bases contrasts with the higher risks and greater resource commitments that the U.S. would need to undertake. President Donald J. Trump is likely to expect the Philippines to shoulder more of its own defense responsibilities rather than rely heavily on U.S. security guarantees. During Trump's first term, when then-Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte threatened to terminate the VFA, Trump publicly stated that he did not mind, as it would save money.[③] A

① "LEGACY OR LIABILITY? Auditing U.S. Alliances to Compete with China", *CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE*, October 2025, https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Chivvis_Alliances_report-2025.pdf
② "Sustaining U.S. Army Operations in the Indo-Pacific", *RAND*, June 5, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2434-3.html
③ "Trump brushes off Duterte's decision to end military pact", *ALJAZEERA*, February 12, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/12/trump-brushes-off-dutertes-decision-to-end-military-pact

RAND Corporation study pointed out that integrating the military capabilities of allies and partners into theater operations during wartime faces numerous challenges and constraints. These limitations substantially weakened the U.S. ability to rely on allies and partners for logistics support in a conflict. The problem is even more acute in the Indo-Pacific region, where logistics support planning in many countries lags far behind that of Europe.[①]

The consistent adoption of the "America First" and global strategic retrenchment posture during Trump's second term introduced greater uncertainty into U.S.-Philippine cooperation. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,* issued by the White House in December 2025 explicitly states: "Our allies must step up and spend—and more importantly do—much more for collective defense."[②] Against this broader backdrop of urging allies to take on far greater burdens, the U.S. is highly unlikely to make large-scale investments in the Philippines.

Immediately upon taking office in 2025, the Trump administration imposed a freeze on foreign aid as part of its "America First" agenda, initiating a review of all U.S. foreign development assistance programs to ensure they serve U.S. national interests. The administration submitted to

[①] "Sustaining U.S. Army Operations in the Indo-Pacific", *RAND*, Jun 5, 2025, http://rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2434-3.html

[②] "National Security Strategy of the United States of America", *White House*, November 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

Congress a rescission package totaling $9.4 billion, which the House of Representatives narrowly passed by a vote of 214–212.[①] In April 2024, then-President Biden requested an additional $128 million in the FY2025 budget for 36 new projects at the nine EDCA Bases in the Philippines.[②] However, since Trump took office, actual U.S. funding assistance for EDCA base development has been extremely limited. According to incomplete statistics, in 2025 the U.S. supported only six EDCA expansion projects in the Philippines, with a total value of approximately $13.11 million.

Table 3: U.S.-Funded EDCA Base Expansion Projects in 2025[③]

No.	Base	Date	Amount (USD)	Contractor	Prime Award ID	Award Description
1	Antonio Bautista Air Base	2025.6.25-2025.10.9	32,094.00	Planate Management Group LLC	N6274225F0008	Design services for repair of above-ground fuel tank
2	Lumbia Air Base	2025.7.24-2027.1.31	411,303.00	GHD INC.	N6274225F0330	Advanced planning study - pavement assessment Lumbia Air Base
3	Lumbia Air Base	2025.9.26-2027.4.29	1,870,904.19	RORE, INC.	N6274225F6516	D/B UFC construct multi-purpose warehouse
4	Camp Melchor Dela Cruz	2025.4.24-2026.7.18	1,260,621.65	Sea Pac Engineering, Inc.	N6274225F0136	IMACC NAVFACPAC AOR - Seed Project Design-Build UFC PC24-03, Command and Control Fusion Center

① "Fact Sheet: Trump's Rescission Request Would Slash Spending on Foreign Assistance Programs That Benefit American Interests", *Center for American Progress*, June 20, 2025, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/fact-sheet-trumps-rescission-request-would-slash-spending-on-foreign-assistance-programs-that-benefit-american-interests/#:~:text=Doug%20Molof&text=On%20June%203%2C%20the%20Trump,and%20benefits%20for%20USAID%20staff.

② "Biden seeks $128-M budget for EDCA projects", *The Presidential Communications Office of the Philippines*, April 12, 2024, https://pco.gov.ph/news_releases/biden-seeks-128-m-budget-for-edca-projects/

③ USA SPENDING.gov, https://www.usaspending.gov/

5	Camp Melchor Dela Cruz	2025.7.14-2026.7.13	338,539.00	GHD INC.	N6274225F0331	This is for advanced planning for the road network at Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in the Philippines
6	Mactan–Benito Ebuen Air Base	2025.9.25-2027.4.28	9,199,602.27	RORE, INC.	N6274225F6509	D/B UFC construct maintenance, operations facility and multi-purpose warehouses

3.3 Uncertainty in Philippine Domestic Politics

Compared with the Duterte administration, the Marcos Jr. administration has adopted a more proactive approach toward U.S.-Philippine relations, seeking to strengthen the Philippines' capacity to safeguard and advance its maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea through the U.S.-Philippine alliance. The addition of four new EDCA sites in 2023 represented a major concession by Manila to deepen military cooperation with Washington. Nevertheless, domestic opposition to EDCA bases has persisted.

Current Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Imee Marcos (the President's elder sister) has repeatedly questioned the expansion of the EDCA, arguing that it primarily serves U.S. strategic interests at the expense of Philippine national interests and increases the country's strategic vulnerability.[①] She has stated that, amid heightened tensions in

[①] "Imee Marcos questions new Edca sites: Why a stone's throw away from Taiwan?", *Inquirer*, March 1, 2023, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/211570/imee-marcos-questions-new-edca-sites-why-a-stones-throw-away-from-taiwan

the South China Sea, the agreement obliges the Philippines to host U.S. troops and store U.S. military equipment, effectively turning the country into a potential target for U.S. adversaries, and that EDCA should therefore be terminated.

Cagayan Province Governor Manuel Mamba has warned that the new EDCA bases force the people of Cagayan directly in the crossfire of a potential U.S.-China conflict.[①] In March 2026, Raymond Palatino, Secretary-General of Philippine civic group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), stated that EDCA sites in the Philippines, along with other areas housing U.S. military supplies and equipment, may subject the country to vulnerability in the escalating conflict. "It is the Americans who control the EDCA sites. It also houses the war equipment of the U.S. and their troops. Mainly, it operates as a U.S. base."[②]

Furthermore, the May 2025 midterm elections produced underwhelming results for the Marcos Jr. administration. Of the 12 Senate seats up for election, 5 went to candidates aligned with the Duterte family, 5 to candidates supporting President Marcos Jr., and 2 to centrists or liberal-leaning figures. According to the 2028 presidential preference

① "The Philippines in danger of being sucked into US-China conflict over Taiwan", *Frontline*, May 18, 2023, https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/us-military-back-in-control-of-bases-in-philippines-puts-country-in-danger-of-being-sucked-into-us-china-conflict-over-taiwan/article66830109.ece

② "Independent foreign policy pushed amid US-Israel aggression vs. Iran, Venezuela", *BULATLAT*, March 4, 2026, https://www.bulatlat.com/2026/03/04/independent-foreign-policy-pushed-amid-us-israel-aggression-vs-iran-venezuela/

survey released by Pulse Asia, Sara Duterte exhibited strong competitiveness across diverse candidate combinations. She secured 51 percent of support in a head-to-head matchup against Leni Robredo and ranked first with 43 percent support in a multi-candidate scenario.[①] Released in March 2026, the public opinion survey showed that Bongbong Marcos registered an approval rating of 36% and a trust rating of 35%, while Sara Duterte achieved 55% and 54% respectively, which were distinctly higher than those of Marcos.[②] Accordingly, when promoting EDCA-related base cooperation, expanding access for U.S. military forces and consolidating bilateral military coordination, the Marcos Jr. administration has to fully consider domestic political divisions and public opinion constraints. Should Sara Duterte win the 2028 presidential election, the Philippines may seek to reduce the U.S. military presence on its soil and further strengthen ties with China.

① "2028 PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE", *Pulse Asia Research Inc*., March 2, 2026, https://pulseasia.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/UB-Mar-2026-SJMZ-Riders.pdf
② "MEDIA RELEASE", *Pulse Asia Research Inc*., March 16, 2026, https://pulseasia.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/MR2-UB2026-1-MR-on-Ratings-and-Urgent-Concerns-final.pdf

4. Summary

As a major U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific and a South China Sea claimant, the Philippines has long been regarded by the U.S. as a "strategic pawn" for stirring tension in the South China Sea and even the Taiwan Strait. Since Marcos Jr. took office in 2022, he has comprehensively restarted and upgraded the military alliance with the U.S., closely aligning Philippine strategy with Washington and shifting the country from "balanced diplomacy" to the "front line of confrontation." Through EDCA, the U.S. continues to expand its military footprint on Philippine bases and conducts realistic combat exercises involving autonomous weapons and unmanned platforms to enhance bilateral and multilateral interoperability.

However, Philippine bases offer limited utility in wartime. Therefore, the Philippines' strategic positioning is primarily as a supplement to U.S. military bases in Japan, and U.S. investment in base expansion has fallen short of expectations. To enhance interoperability and combat readiness, bilateral and multilateral joint exercises and training between the U.S. and the Philippines are expected to continue on the rise, strengthening their distributed denial capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, to address the region's lack of forward ammunition and equipment production capacity, the U.S. may push for the establishment of joint ammunition manufacturing and storage facilities, as well as ship repair

facilities, at Subic Bay, thereby enhancing the Philippines' ability to provide logistical support to U.S. forces.

The U.S.-Philippines military cooperation has leapt from a traditional "defensive alliance" to a key component of the Indo-Pacific "integrated deterrence" framework. The EDCA base network has completed a strategic encirclement layout against China that "locks the Taiwan Strait from the north and controls the South China Sea from the south." Continuous investment in infrastructure expansion is turning the Philippines into a forward combat hub.

Deploying assets such as F-35, NMESIS, HIMARS, and unmanned surface vessels, the U.S. has achieved a shift from "rotational access" to "quasi-permanent presence" and from "bilateral exercises" to "multilateral joint operations". Through a tiered cooperation network of the "core four countries" (U.S.-Philippines-Japan-Australia) plus extended partners, the U.S. has further embedded the Philippines within its Indo-Pacific strategy and command chain.

However, these forces are primarily a peacetime presence and would be extremely vulnerable in a high-end conflict. Their existence serves more political, strategic, and diplomatic purposes—using a relatively small military footprint to disrupt the situation, shape the environment, and push

developments in a direction favorable to the U.S. Judging from U.S. investment and troop deployment, these bases are mainly intended to function as backup and logistics nodes in times of crisis or conflict, serving as supplements to U.S. bases in Japan.

Since 2013, although the U.S. has made significant progress in expanding Philippine bases and increasing its military presence there, the importance of these developments should not be overstated. The current situation in both the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait remains tense but has not yet erupted into open conflict ("hot but not exploding"). [①] The U.S. is willing to exploit these Philippine bases, actively using them to shape the strategic environment, contain China, and drain Chinese resources, yet it is unwilling to invest too heavily—especially since the existing infrastructure in the Philippines is poor and would require massive additional investment to achieve wartime resilience. The Philippine expectation that U.S. military presence will deter China is fundamentally unrealistic.

For China and other stakeholders, it is essential to objectively assess the trajectory of the U.S.-Philippine military alliance development and its impact on their own interests. While taking seriously the wartime threat

[①] Hu Bo. "South China Sea Situation in 2025: Remain Heated Without Seething," *South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative*, January 13, 2025, https://www.scspi.org/en/dtfx/south-china-sea-situation-2025-remain-heated-without-seething

posed by the U.S. military presence and deployments in the Philippines, greater attention should be paid to the restraints and attrition these arrangements and related activities impose on China during peacetime.[①]

[①] Hu Bo, "Fact and Fiction: The U.S. Military's Growing Presence in the Philippines," *Modern Ships*, No. 12, 2025.

Appendices

Appendix A: Statistics on Selected U.S.-Philippine Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises (2025–2026)

NO.	Name	Date	Location	Participant	Force	Subject
1	Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.1.17 -1.18	South China Sea	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Carl Vinson, USS Princeton, USS Kidd, USS Sterett, MH-60R/S Seahawks, CMV-22 Osprey and 2*F/A-18E/F Super Hornets Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Andrés Bonifacio, 2*FA-50PH fighters	Formation sailing, Joint search and rescue missions, communication procedures, and Interoperability training
2	Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.2.5	South China Sea	U.S., Japan, Australia, Philippines	Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal Australia: HMAS Hobart, P-8A Japan: JS Akizuki U.S.: USS Benfold, P-8A	Communication check exercises, maritime domain awareness and contact reporting, division tactics and officer of the watch maneuver, anti-submarine warfare exercises, and photo exercise
3	Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.2.12	South China Sea	U.S., Philippines, Canada	U.S.: USS Benfold, P-8A Philippines: BRP Andrés Bonifacio Canada: HMCS Ottawa	Communication check exercises, anti-submarine warfare exercises, and photo exercise
4	CATEX Katihan	2025.2.17 -3.22	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: 1st Multi-Domain Task Force Philippines: about 6,000 troops	Combined Arms Training Exercise
5	Salaknib 25-1	2025.3.24 -4.11	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	More than 5,000 U.S. and Philippine soldiers	joint logistical cross-shore operations, joint combined arms maneuver warfare, and live-fire exercises
6	Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.3.28	South China Sea	U.S., Japan, Philippines	U.S.: USS Shoup, P-8A Japan: JS Noshiro Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal, C-90	Joint maritime patrols, formation sailing, communication and intelligence sharing, joint search and rescue exercises, and Simulated defense of South China Sea territories with allied command coordination
7	MAREX	2025.3.31	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	Approximately 480 Filipino and	Amphibious assault

	2025	-4.11			U.S. Marines	demonstration rehearsal, jungle patrolling, and tactical combat casualty care
8	Cope Thunder 25-1	2025.4.7-4.18	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Philippines	Over 250 U.S. Air Force personnel and 12 F-16 fighter jets, along with more than 700 Philippine Air Force personnel and a variety of aircraft for the exercise	Bilateral fighter training operation
9	Balikatan 2025	2025.4.21-5.9	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Philippines, Australia, Japan (19 observer countries including the U.K., France, Canada, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Netherlands, Germany, India, Indonesia, etc.)	At least 14,000 troops (9,000 from the U.S. and 5,000 from the Philippines). In addition, approximately 260 Australian Defence Force personnel, around 200 Japanese troops, and staff from other Philippine government agencies also took part. The NMESIS was deployed for the first time.	Missile defense, counter-landing live fires, and humanitarian assistance
10	Joint Combined Counter-Landing and Live-Fire Exercise	2025.4.28	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Philippines, Australia, (Japan as an observer)	More than 800 personnel from the U.S., Philippines and Australia	Counter-landing defense training, tactical artillery relocation via land/sea/air lift, synchronized firepower missions combining howitzers and HIMARS precision strikes, simulated amphibious invasion response drills, replenishment-at-sea and intelligence sharing
11	Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.4.29	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Philippines, Australia	U.S.: F-16 and F-18 Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, AW-159, FA-50 Australia: HMAS Sydney	Communication exercises, aerial patrols, and anti-submarine warfare exercises
12	Trilateral U.S.-Australia-Philippines Joint Airborne Assault Exercise	2025.5.4	Philippines	U.S., Philippines, Australia, (Japan as an observer)	More than 1,200 troops from the U.S., Philippines, and Australia	Combined joint all-domain operation

13	Salaknib 25-2	2025.5.19 -7.20	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	More than 5,000 troops from the U.S. and Philippines	joint logistical cross-shore operations, joint combined arms maneuver warfare, and live-fire exercises
14	Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.5.20	South China Sea	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USCGC Stratton Philippines: BRP Ramon Alcaraz, BRP Domingo De Luana, BRP Melchora Aquino, BRP Malapascua, AW-109	Communications Check Exercise, Search and Rescue Exercise, Division Tactics and Officer of the Watch Maneuver, and Photo Exercise
15	Joint Amphibious Exercise	2025.5.22 -6.6	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	more than 200 elite troops from the PN, Marines, Coast Guard, Special Action Force, Maritime police, and U.S. military forces	live-fire sea operations, amphibious assaults, and ship boarding simulations
16	KAMANDAG9	2025.5.26 -6.6	Philippines	U.S., Philippines, Japan, South Korea, U.K. (7 observer countries: France, Canada, Bahrain, Australia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Netherlands)	A total of 2,028 Filipino troops (Philippine Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve, PNP, and PCG), 2,031 U.S. Marines, plus 80 from South Korea, 80 from Japan, and 6 from the UK participated in the exercise.	Maritime key terrain security operations, defensive counter-landing live-fire drills, littoral maneuver, amphibious operations, and HADR training
17	Bilateral Joint Live-Fire Exercise	2025.5.29	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	/	This joint live-fire exercise employed 81mm mortars
18	Joint Air Assault Training Exercise	2025.5.29	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	CH-47、UH-60	Real-time sync, fast troop deployment, and airfield security procedures
19	Pacific Partnership 2025	2025.5.29 -6.12	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	Members of the Hawaii National Guard, the Center for Excellence-Disaster Management, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines	HADR training
20	JPMRC-X	2025.5.31 -6.6	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	U.S. and Philippine Army	Combat exercise
21	Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.6.4	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment Philippines: BRP Miguel Malvar	Communications Check Exercises, Division Tactics and Officer of the Watch Maneuvers, and Photo Exercises

22	Japan–U.S.–Philippines Joint Coastal Defense Exercise	2025.6.16-6.20	Japan	U.S., Japan, Philippines	The Philippine Coast Guard, Japan Coast Guard, and the United States Coast Guard. The BRP Teresa Magbanua and a 123-member PCG delegation were also involved	The exercise included a Communication Exercise, a Search and Rescue Exercise, a Fire Fighting Exercise, and a Photo Exercise
23	Joint Air Assault Training Exercise	2025.6.17	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	CH-47、UH-60	Air assault drills
24	Jungle warfare exercises	2025.6.23-7.15	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	U.S. and Philippine Marines	Included a series of live-fire drills, jungle patrol operations, survival skills training, and exchanges on small unmanned aerial system tactics
25	Cope Thunder 25-2	2025.7.7-7.18	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: 225 personnel and F-35 fighter aircraft Philippines: 2,301 personnel and a range of air assets, including FA-50PH fighter jets, A-29B Super Tucanos, AW109 helicopters, S-76A, and S-70i Black Hawk helicopters	Field Training Exercises
26	Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.7.16	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Curtis Wilbur, P-8A Philippines: BRP Miguel Malvar, BRP Cabra, BRP Suluan	Included communication checks, exercising maritime domain awareness, data sharing, and combined targeting exercises against simulated targets
27	Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.9.2-9.3	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Philippines, Australia, Canada	U.S.: P-8A Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal, AW-159, C-208B Australia: HMAS Brisbane, P-8A Canada: HMCS Ville de Quebéc, CH-148	at-sea logistics and resupply operations, and anti-submarine warfare exercise
28	The 24rd annual Southeast Asia Cooperation and	2025.9.5-2025.9.19	Singapore	U.S., Singapore, Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Canada, France, German, Indonesia, Japan,	/	Maritime Security Operations; simulated tracking, interception, and boarding of “dark vessels” (unmarked merchant ships); intelligence sharing and

	Training (SEACAT) exercise			Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, U.K., Vietnam		multinational coordination; combined search-and-rescue and anti-smuggling training
29	Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.9.12-13	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Philippines, Japan	U.S.: USS John Finn, P-8A, MH-60R Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal, AW-109, C-208B, FA-50 Japan: JS Osumi	included a Communications Check Exercise to ensure effective coordination; Maritime Domain Awareness activities; an Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise; a Cross-Deck Landing Exercise; and Naval Surface Interdiction and Clearance
30	SAMASA MA 2025	2025.10.6-17	Philippines	U.S., Philippines, Australia, Japan, France, U.K., Canada (3 observer countries: Thailand, Italy, New Zealand)	U.S.: USS Cincinnati, P-8A Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Ramon Alcaraz, BRP Valentin Diaz, BRP Lolinato To-Ong Japan: JS Ōnami Canada: HMCS Max Bernays	Replenishment-at-sea approaches, photo and air defense exercises, combined anti-submarine operations, publication, and screening exercises
31	Marine Aviation Support Activity (MASA) 25	2025.10.15-10.24	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Philippines	About 654 personnel of U.S. and Philippine Marine Corps	Coastal defense and maritime strike, military free fall, helicopter underway emergency training
32	Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.10.30-10.31	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Philippines, Australia, New Zealand	U.S.: USS Fitzgerald Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal, AW-109, C-208B, A-29B Australia: HMAS Ballarat, MH-60R New Zealand: HMNZS Aotearoa	Anti-Submarine Warfare, Replenishment- and Fueling-at-Sea exercises
33	Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.11.14	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Japan, Philippines	U.S.: USS Nimitz, USS Wayne Meyer, USS Gridley, USS Lenah Sutcliffe Higbee Japan: JS Akebono, SH-60K Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal, BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Melchora Aquino, BRP Cape San Agustin, AW-159	Communication check exercise, resupply-at-sea approach, and anti-submarine warfare exercise

34	Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.12.9-10	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Rafael Peralta, P-8A, MH-60R Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal, 3*FA-50, 3*A-29B	Division Tactics (DIVTACS), complex ship maneuvering exercises, Night Steaming in Company (NSIC)
35	Maritime Cooperative Activity	2025.12.15	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Robert Smalls, MH-60R, P-8A Philippines: BRP Miguel Malvar, 3*A-29B, 3*FA-50	communication check exercises,division tactics, a photo exercise
36	Maritime Cooperative Activity	2026.1.25-1.26	South China Sea	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS John Finn, MH-60R Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Gabriela Silang, FA-50PH, A-29, AW-109	surface combat exercises, night companion navigation, photographic exercises and passing exercises
37	Bilateral bomber air patrols and live-fire drills	2026.2.2-2.6	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: B-52 Philippines: FA-50PH	live drop exercise, air patrol, Air defense drill
38	Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity	2026.2.15-2.16	South China Sea	U.S., Philippines, Australia	U.S.: USS Dewey, P-8A Philippines: BRP Diego Silang, AW-109, FA-50, A-29, C-208B, BRP Teresa Magbanua Australia: HMAS Towoomba, P-8A	Communication Exercise, Division Tactics, photographic exercises and replenishment-at-sea
39	Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity	2026.2.20-2.26	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Philippines, Japan	U.S.: USS Dewey, P-8A Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, 2*FA-50 Japan: P-3C	replenishment at sea, joint air patrols near the Bashi Strait, and tactical maneuver drills
40	Maritime Cooperative Activity	2026.3.20	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USS Blue Ridge Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Gabriela Silang, A-29B, C-208B	communications checks, Reconnaissance shooting
41	Cope Thunder 26-1	2026.4.6-4.17	Philippines	U.S., Philippines	About 2800 Philippine Air Force personnel and U.S. Pacific Air Force personnel participated	Bilateral fighter training operation
42	Salaknib 26-1	2026.4.6-4.17	Philippines	U.S., Philippines, Japan, Australia, New Zealand	About 7000 soldiers	Jungle combat, aviation operations, live-fire shooting and island defense,
43	Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity	2026.4.9-4.12	South China Sea	U.S., Philippines, Australia	U.S.: USS Ashland Philippines: BRP Rajah Sulayman, AW-109, FA-50, A-29B, C208B Australia: HMAS Toowoomba, MH-60R, P-8A	communication drills, maritime domain awareness activities and supporting equipment offload

44	Balikatan 2025	2026.4.20 -5.8	Philippines , South China Sea	Philippines, U.S., Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France (with the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, and the Netherlands as observer countries)	More than 17,000 troops (10,000 from the U.S. and 7,000 from the Philippines, Japan, France, Canada, and Australia)	Coastal Defense Exercise, Counter Landing Exercise, anti-submarine warfare and gunnery exercises
45	Trilateral U.S.-Australia-Philippines Joint Airborne Assault Exercise	2026.4.23 -4.30	Philippines , South China Sea	U.S., Philippines, Australia	U.S.: 21st Infantry Regiment Philippines: 5th Infantry Division Australia: Australian Army soldiers assigned to 5th/7th Battalion	long-range maritime air assault, seize and control remote airports and jungle environment adaptation training
46	Maritime Cooperative Activity	2026.5.26 -30	Philippines , South China Sea	U.S., Philippines	U.S.: USCGC Midgett, MH-65 Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Melchora Aquino, AW-109	search and rescue exercises, visit-board-search-and-seizure drills, maritime law enforcement training, rotary wing deck landing qualifications, vertical replenishment operations, and communication exercises

Appendix B: EDCA Base Expansion Projects in the Philippines Since 2014

NO.	Base	Date	Amount (USD)	Contractor	Prime Award ID	Award Description
1	**Basa Air Base**	2014.12.16-2016.3.31	473,911.09	ENDEC	N6274215C6621	Construct aviation ammunition holding area
		2015.2.24-2015.4.30	74,690.70	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274215P6704	BK15 facilities improvements
		2017.12.28-2019.2.21	1,418,811.63	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274218C6519	Multi-purpose hadr warehouse & maintenance facility
		2017.12.28-2019..1.12	419,310.79	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274218C6520	C2 Fusion Center

		2018.9.20-2021.8.20	1,058,856.85	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274218C6568	D/B UFC Fuel Storage Facility
		2020.2.21-2022.10.3	63,143.00	Lubwell Corporation	FA521523P0002	Unauthorized commitment for Cesar Basa/Clark fuel storage that occurred in FY 2020
		2020.9.15-2023.3.31	1,426,648.39	Forward Slope	N0003920F0072	Establish a wing operations center
		2022.1.21-2023.10.29	2,438,931.95	Capbuild Construction Corp.	N6274222C6801	D/B UFC construction of Runway Improvements
		2022.3.8-2024.12.31	475,850.00	Jacobs Government Services Co	N6274222F0320	Preliminary joint area development plan
		2022.5.10-2027.2.28	3,952,492.00	Stanley - Versar Asia Pacific JV	N6274222F0334	Transient aircraft parking apron
		2022.9.29-2024.3.27	28,569,555.00	Environmental Chemical Corporation	N6274222F4033	D/B UFC repair of runway and overrun
		2023.7.28-2025.8.23	5,225,460.65	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274223C6604	D/B UFC construction of Roads and Taxiway Shoulders
		2023.8.25-2024.10.31	533,039.00	USA Environmental	N6274223F0201	Advanced geophysical classification survey and explosive safety submission in support of military construction project P-9001 Basa Air Base
		2023.9.21-2024.12.14	2,060,489.14	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274223C6626	Construction of South Arm/De-Arm Pad
		2023.9.21-2024.12.14	2,293,463.85	E.M. Cuerpo, Inc. / Gnesis8 Design and Development Construction Services	N6274223C6620	Construction of North Arm/De-Arm Pad
		2024.8.19-2026.7.17	32,967,075.00	Acciona CMS Philippines LLC	N6274224C1304	PDI transient aircraft parking apron
		2024.9.17-2025.8.20	617,916.72	Capbuild Construction Corp.	N6274224C6731	D/B UFC renovation of C2 Fusion Center

		2024.9.18-2025.7.15	560,073.91	JRMX Construction & General Merchandise	N6274224C6730	D/B UFC renovate Operations Building and Transient Barracks and fabricate and install Hangar Door
		2024.9.18-2025.10.23	2,009,200.22	Capbuild Construction Corp.	N6274224C6716	D/B UFC repair of Taxiways D-E and C-E
		2024.9.19-2025.11.22	2,102,436.80	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274224C6720	D/B UFC construction of Entry Control Point, Perimeter Wall, and Access Roads
2	**Fort Magsaysay**	2014.9.15-2014.12.9	50,359.09	Miscellaneous Foreign Awardees	FA523414C0009	FMSS Water Distro & Electrical
		2014.12.9-2015.2.18	10,233.14	Miscellaneous Foreign Awardees	FA523415C4001	FMSS Pumphouse
		2015.3.31-2015.10.1	47,481.45	Optra Five Enterprise, Inc.	N6274215P6703	BK15 facilities improvements, various locations: Camp Aguinaldo, Clark Air Base and FMSS
		2016.10.25-2018.1.20	567,857.36	ENDEC	N6274217C6821	Construction of roadways FMSS Training Area Access Road
		2017.3.31-2017.5.27	52,997.74	Optra Five Enterprise	N6274217P6514	BK17 facilities readiness, Basa Airbase, Pampanga; Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City; and Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, and Palawan
		2018.9.17-2019.8.14	58,354.98	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274218C6559	Design-build PC18-08 multi-purpose HADR warehouse & maintenance facility
		2018.9.23-2021.3.4	1,085,674.19	Bordeaux builders	N6274218C6555	Design-BID-build project for Close Quarters Battle
		2022.9.16-2024.1.6	1,457,888.81	Bordeaux Builders	N6274222C6809	D/B UFC construction of HADR Warehouse & Maintenance Facility
		2023.8.12-2024.9.15	289,653.16	KRD Enterprise pte. Ltd.	N6274223C6614	Contract award for D/B UFC construction of

						Secured Communications Building
		2023.9.11-2024.9.10	661,635.20	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274223C6609	D/B construction of Range at FMSS LRR
		2023.9.11-2024.9.30	586,978.93	Bordeaux builders	N6274223C6616	D/B UFC construction of C2 Fusion Building
		2023.9.14-2025.3.7	5,216,772.40	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274223C6606	D/B construction of FMSS MOUT facility
		2024.9.12-2026.3.7	1,523,886.20	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274224C6710	D/B UFC construction of live fire shoot house (MOUT) Fort Magsaysay Laur
		2024.9.18-2026.3.13	1,874,826.40	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274224C6714	Live fire shoot house (SOF)
		2024.9.19-2025.12.14	1,569,923.32	JRMX Construction & General Merchandise	N6274224C6711	D/B UFC PC25-38 Vehicle Maintenance & Parking Bays (SOF), PC25-36 Covered Training Area (SOF), and PC25-39 Vehicle Maintenance & Parking Bays (1BCT) FMSS
		2024.9.21-2025.12.15	917,156.73	JRMX Construction & General Merchandise	N6274224C6712	D/B UFC construction of Vehicle Maintenance Facility and Covered Training Area (Airfield)
		2024.9.22-2025.12.14	1,953,188.84	Capbuild Construction	N6274224C6713	Construct Simulation Facility
3	**Antonio Bautista Air Base**	2015.1.7-2015.12.12	289,878.00	Wee builders	N6274215C6617	Wescom ammunition supply facility
		2015.3.7-2015.12.4	371,971.99	Yellowgrey Construction Company	N6274215C6615	Construction of fuel storage facility
		2015.9.28-2016.10.12	360,438.61	R.V. Dagalea Construction	N6274215C6713	Construction of letc compound facilities improvements
		2018.9.25-2019.9.4	573,089.25	Capbuild Construction Corp.	N6274218C6567	D/B C2 fusion facility

		2025.6.25-2025.10.9	32,094.00	Planate Management Group LLC	N6274225F0008	Design services for repair of above-ground fuel tank
4	**Mactan–Benito Ebuen Air Base**	2021.9.28-2024.7.14	2,434,824.25	Himalayan Builders and Engineers Pvt. Ltd.	N6274221C6704	Construct Fuel Storage Facility
		2022.9.27-2025.12.31	788,195.00	Ghd Setiadi Kaula Ae Joint Venture	N6274222F0457	Table top JADPS and JADPS at Lumbia and Mactan Air Base
		2024.4.22-2024.5.21	5,277.77	Adventravel Enterprises Ltd. Co.	FA500024P0031	Two light towers located at Mactan AB to light the aircraft at night
		2025.9.25-2027.4.28	9,199,602.27	RORE, INC.	N6274225F6509	D/B UFC construct maintenance, operations facility and multi-purpose warehouses
5	**Lumbia Air Base**	2018.7.11-2018.9.11	47,891.00	Stanley - Versar Asia Pacific JV	N6274218F4008	C2 Fusion Center & WESCOM and HADR warehous-lumbia Airbase
		2025.7.24-2027.1.31	411,303.00	GHD INC.	N6274225F0330	Advanced planning study - pavement assessment Lumbia Air Base
		2025.9.26-2027.4.29	1,870,904.19	RORE, INC.	N6274225F6516	D/B UFC construct multi-purpose warehouse
6	**Camp Melchor Dela Cruz**	2025.4.24-2026.7.18	1,260,621.65	Sea Pac Engineering, Inc.	N6274225F0136	IMACC NAVFACPAC AOR - Seed Project Design-Build UFC PC24-03, Command and Control Fusion Center
		2025.7.14-2026.7.13	338,539.00	GHD INC.	N6274225F0331	This is for advanced planning for the road network at Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in the Philippines
总计			**124,650,854.61**			

Appendix C: U.S.-Provided Life Support Services Projects for Philippine Bases

NO.	Date	Amount (USD)	Contractor	Prime Award ID	Award Description
1	2022.3.2-2022.4.17	141,112.25	Adventravel Enterprises Ltd. Co.	FA520522P0018	Vans and driver services for Basa, Clark, and Wallace locations in Philippines
2	2022.3.7-2022.4.15	36,101.03	JT Square Pte	FA520522P0024	Heavy equipment rental at Basa Air Base for forklift and flood lights
3	2022.3.9-2022.4.12	11,948.98	Nazareth Trading and Equipment Rental Services	FA520522P0027	Portable latrines and hand wash stations for Basa Air Base
4	2022.3.24-2022.4.9	14,181.45	Nazareth Trading and Equipment Rental Services	FA520522P0030	Generator for Basa Air Base
5	2024.4.6-2024.5.15	9,341.60	Nazareth Trading and Equipment Rental Services	FA500024P0027	Trash removal service at Basa and Clark Air Bases ISO Cope Thunder and Balikatan
6	2024.4.10-2024.5.10	37,715.67	Parsh Marine Philippines	FA500024F0033	3D MAW (USMC) portable building rental for Basa Air Base in accordance with the attached statement of work and pricelist
7	2024.4.13-2024.5.10	11,083.67	Nazareth Trading and Equipment Rental Services	FA500024P0030	10K forklift with operator and trash removal service for Balikatan POP: 13 April 2024 - 10 May 2024 service at Basa AB for 3D MAW
8	2024.4.13-2024.5.10	13,434.39	Adventravel Enterprises Ltd. Co.	FA500024P0036	Generators and MISC items at Basa for Balikatan
9	2024.4.15-2024.5.10	6,604.94	Adventravel Enterprises Ltd. Co.	FA500024P0035	Table, chair, and generator rentals at Basa AB ISO Balikatan
10	2024.4.21-2024.5.12	1,825.04	JTG Corporation Pte. Ltd.	FA500024P0032	Daily trash removal service at Mactan AB for Balikatan
11	2024.4.22-2024.5.11	22,055.51	Quantum Tech Multi-Fab Trading And Services Inc.	FA500024P0034	Generator rental at Basa AB for Balikatan 2024
12	2024.4.23-2024.5.11	2,734.31	Quantum Tech Multi-Fab Trading And Services Inc.	FA500024P0039	Air conditioner unit rentals at Basa Air Base
13	2024.5.30-2024.6.22	29,044.77	Parsh Marine Philippines Inc	W91QVP24F0006	SN/BK24 Basa BLS
14	2024.6.18-2024.6.28	1,350.75	Nazareth Trading and Equipment Rental Services	FA500024P0054	Trash removal service at Basa Air Base for Cope Thunder 24-2
15	2024.6.18-2024.6.28	6,308.28	Adventravel Enterprises Ltd. Co.	FA500024P0058	4000 psi pressure washer rental at Basa Air Base for Cope Thunder 24-2
16	2025.2.25-2025.9.30	220,850.61	KVG Philippines Fze Inc.	W91QVP25F0011	Salaknib Balikatan 2025 Subic Base life support

17	2025.3.1-2025.9.30	1,457,284.87	KVG Philippines Fze Inc.	W91QVP25F0009	Base life support for Salakinib Balikatan 2025 at Fort Magsaysay
18	2025.3.3-2025.9.30	199,557.92	KVG Philippines Fze Inc.	W91QVP25F0006	Clark base life support for Salaknib Balikatan 2025
19	2025.3.4-2025.7.11	80,034.45	EPIC Transport and Logistics Opc	W91QVP25F0004	Salaknib Balakitan 25 Aquino Base life support
20	2025.3.5-2025.8.15	210,094.75	JTG Corporation Pte. Ltd.	W91QVP25F0003	Basa base life support
21	2025.3.5-2025.9.30	157,259.30	KVG Philippines Fze Inc.	W91QVP25F0008	Salaknib-Balikatan-25 Camp Aguinaldo life support
22	2025.3.17-2025.8.3	257,097.85	EPIC Transport and Logistics Opc	W91QVP25FA003	Commercial base life support for Subic Bay Naval Base
23	2025.3.24-2025.5.10	43,683.23	EPIC Transport and Logistics Opc	W91QVP25FA007	Commercial base life support for Subic Bay Naval Base
24	2025.3.25-2025.5.22	28,494.54	JTG Corporation Pte. Ltd.	M6845025FM003	Base life support services
25	2025.3.25-2025.7.2	77,451.30	KVG Philippines Fze Inc.	W91QVP25F0012	Salakanib Balakitan 25 Tecson Base life support
26	2025.3.25-2025.7.11	361,999.93	San Antonio Marketing Enterprises, Inc.	W91QVP25FA010	Base life support services
27	2025.3.26-2025.4.13	28,449.00	WSL LOGISTICS SUPPORT	M6845025FA002	Dingalan - base life support services
28	2025.4.1-2025.5.9	71,010.14	EPIC Transport and Logistics Opc	M6845025FM004	Base life support services
29	2025.4.2-2025.6.16	776,851.59	LA Reena Enterprise Inc.	M0031825F0032	Base life support services
30	2025.4.2-2025.6.18	615,601.30	JTG Corporation Pte. Ltd.	M0031825F0031	Base life support services
31	2025.4.4-2025.5.28	471,351.69	Josea Trans, Inc.	M6845025PM001	Base life support services
32	2025.4.12-2025.6.15	64,501.05	IPGS Corporation Pte. Ltd.	M6845025FM002	Base life support services
33	2025.4.15-2025.5.9	261,373.87	Josea Trans, Inc.	W91QVP25FA012	Base life support services
34	2025.4.17-2025.5.1	176,595.21	Relyant Global Philippines, Inc.	W91QVP25FA014	Itbayat base life support Sabak25
35	2025.4.18-2025.5.8	35,984.53	Parsh Marine Philippines Inc	H9242125P1000	Base life support services
36	2025.04.20-2025.05.09	7,428.00	Pacific Defense Contracting LLC	N6264925FM058	Base operations and life support service
37	2025.4.21-2025.4.27	9,518.03	LA Reena Enterprise Inc.	M6845025PA004	Base life support services

38	2025.5.10-2025.6.13	58,620.78	EPIC Transport and Logistics Opc	M6845025FM005	Base life support services
39	2025.5.12-2025.6.15	35,644.74	IPGS Corporation Pte. Ltd.	M6845025FM006	Base life support services
40	2025.05.16-2025.06.13	287,958.86	EPIC Transport and Logistics Opc	M6845025PA005	Base life support services 3D MBG and Naval Detachment Oyster Bay
41	2025.5.17-2025.6.13	121,091.06	San Antonio Marketing Enterprises, Inc.	M6845025FA005	Base life support services
42	2025.5.30-2025.6.13	61,051.20	S.C.A. – Shipping Consultants Associated Ltd.	N6264925FM084	Base operations and life support service
43	2025.6.14-2025.7.20	189,780.75	LA Reena Enterprise Inc.	M6845025FM010	Base life support in 3rd MBG, Palawan ACD
44	2025.07.28-2025.8.27	345,876.13	KVG Philippines Fze Inc.	M6845025PM005	Base operations and life support service
45	2025.7.30-2025.8.30	212,988.20	EPIC Transport and Logistics Opc	M6845025PM004	Commercial base life support for Subic Bay Naval Base
46	2025.8.8-2025.8.30	25,158.46	MISCELLANEOUS FOREIGN AWARDEES	M6845025PS002	Alon Palawan Catering
47	2025.11.28-2025.12.5	492.10	NOBLE SUPPLY & LOGISTICS, LLC	N6264926FM020	Van Rental, 12pax for CTF 72 Detachment in Mactan
总计		**7,295,978.08**			

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