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An Incomplete Report on US Military Activities in the South China Sea in 2025

South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative

June 2026

About SCSPI

With a view to maintaining and promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the South China Sea, we launched the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) in April of 2019. The Initiative aims to integrate intellectual resources and open-source information worldwide and track important actions and major policy changes of key stakeholders and other parties involved. It provides professional data services and analytical reports to parties concerned, helping them manage competition and seek partnerships.

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Preface

In peacetime, conducting high-intensity military activities in a coastal state's surrounding waters, such as thousands of close-in reconnaissance operations and hundreds of targeted military exercises, is contrary to the spirit of the UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and the principles and rules of international law, including "the peaceful uses of the seas" stipulated in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Since 2009, US military activities against China in the South China Sea have escalated both in frequency and intensity. In 2025, amidst the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the US-Israel-Iran conflict, US naval and air forces were continually constrained by situations in the Caribbean, the Middle East, and other regions, leaving them overstretched. Nevertheless, they still maintained a high-intensity military presence in the South China Sea and its periphery.

Under the second Trump administration, the South China Sea has clearly not been a primary focus for the US. However, the US military on the frontlines of the Western Pacific has remained in "autopilot", continuing to intensify its military presence and activities in the South China Sea. In 2025, the activities of strategic platforms such as carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups, and bombers showed limited growth, while the frequency of declaratory operations like Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) declined. Nevertheless, close-in

reconnaissance, drills and exercises, and joint operations with allies and partners saw significant increases.

The US military presence and operations remain major factors affecting the situation in the South China Sea. Since 2019, the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) has annually released an Incomplete Report on US Military Activities in the South China Sea of previous year based on open-source data. The report is intended to promote the transparency regarding the South China Sea situation and provide the perspective as a reference for policymakers, research institutions, the media and the public of relevant parties.

Director of SCSPI Hu Bo

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In 2025, the US military continued to strengthen its military deterrence against China, maintaining high-intensity operations including close-in reconnaissance, Taiwan Strait transits, forward presence, strategic cruising, military exercises and drills, as well as battlefield preparation in the South China Sea and its surrounding areas. Among them, large reconnaissance aircraft conducted about 1,200 missions, and ocean surveillance and oceanographic survey ships accumulated 197 ship days of activity. Carrier strike groups (CSGs) have entered the South China Sea 9 times, demonstrating a strong presence. At least 11 nuclear submarines appeared in the region throughout the year, signaling a clear deterrence intention. Furthermore, bombers conducted 13 sorties across 7 deployments into the South China Sea and its surrounding areas, frequently rehearsing “north-south converging maneuvers” and “distributed operations”.

I. The Sluggish Growth of Strategic Platform Activities

1. CSGs

In 2025, the US military dispatched 4 CSGs, USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), USS Nimitz (CVN-68), USS George Washington (CVN-73) and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), for a total of 9 activities accessing the South China Sea with the following characteristics:

Table 1: Activities of U.S. CSGs in the South China Sea in 2025

No.	Date	CSG	Access	Exit
1	Jan.2(2025)-Feb.6	USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN-70)	Strait of Malacca	Sibutu Passage
2	Apr.2-Apr.4	USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN-70)	Balabac Strait	Strait of Malacca
3	May.1-May.17	USS *Nimitz* (CVN-68)	Bashi Channel	Strait of Malacca
4	May.26-Jun.16	USS *Nimitz* (CVN-68)	Strait of Malacca	Strait of Malacca
5	Jul.1-Jul.9	USS *George Washington* (CVN-73)	Bashi Channel	Sibutu Passage
6	Jul.17-Jul.19	USS *Carl Vinson* (CVN-70)	Strait of Malacca	Balabac Strait
7	Oct.17-Nov.17	USS *Nimitz* (CVN-68)	Strait of Malacca	San Bernardino Strait
8	Nov.17-Nov.22	USS *George Washington* (CVN-73)	Bashi Channel	Visits Guam on Dec.1
9	Dec.24-Jan.18, 2026	USS *Abraham Lincoln* (CVN-72)	San Bernardino Strait	Strait of Malacca

First, there was a slight increase in both the number of deployments and the frequency of transits. Compared to the 8 times in 2024, the frequency of the CSGs' activities in the South China Sea rose to

9 times in 2025. Unlike the prolonged deployment pattern of 2023 and the rapid-transit model of 2024, the CSGs adopted a hybrid approach in 2025. They balanced prolonged presence (5 times of lasting 16-35 days) with rapid "in-and-out" maneuvers (4 times of lasting 2-8 days), while placing greater emphasis on the continuity of carrier deployments. Nevertheless, the actual intensity of CSGs' deployment in the South China Sea has seen a decrease compared to the past.



Figure 1: Tracks of USS Carl Vinson, Dec. 22, 2024-Feb. 25, 2025

As the tension in the Middle East continues to escalate in 2025, plans to deploy CSGs in the region have also placed pressure on the US Navy (USN). According to a report from USNI, the deployment time for US CSGs in the Central Command accounted for 8% of the total deployment time in October, 2023, and this figure rose to 41% in 2024. Since Hamas's attack against Israel and the US military operation against the Houthis in

the Red Sea and the North Arabian Sea, the USN's requirement for the CSGs deployment in the Middle East has surged significantly.[1] In 2025, among the 4 CSGs deployed in the Western Pacific, 3 of them, namely USS *Carl Vinson*, USS *Nimitz*, and USS *Abraham Lincoln*, have been required to shift to the Middle East for military support， making the South China Sea the "transit hub" of resources allocation between the Indo-Pacific Command and the Central Command of the USN.

Second, CSGs as platforms for cooperation and deterrence have been reinforced. Compared to previous. years, constrained by the Middle East crisis and the global deployment pressures, the frequency of US CSGs' routine port visits to countries within the South China Sea has declined prominently in 2025, with their focus shifting from "high-profile presence and a platform for allied diplomacy" to "symbolic visits and high-intensity patrols".

According to open-source and AIS data, USS *Carl Vinson* visited Laem Chabang, Thailand, in January, while USS *George Washington* made a visit to Manila, the Philippines, in July. Earlier, USS *Nimitz* was originally scheduled to visit Da Nang, Vietnam, on June 19 and hold a deck reception on June 20. However, the visit was cancelled when the US

[1] Middle East Aircraft Carrier Commitment Keeps Pressure on U.S. Fleet, Deployment Data Shows, USNI News, June 18, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/06/18/middle-east-aircraft-carrier-commitment-keeps-pressure-on-u-s-fleet-deployment-data-shows

Embassy in Hanoi announced that an urgent issue arose, and the CSG was subsequently diverted to the Central Command.[1]

Meanwhile, U.S. CSGs have deepened their involvement in joint patrols with allies. On January 17-18, the USS *Carl Vinson* CSG conducted a "Maritime Cooperative Activity" (MCA) in the South China Sea alongside the Philippine Navy patrol ship BRP *Andrés Bonifacio* and frigate BRP *Antonio Luna*, as well as Philippine Air Force FA-50 fighter jets. The training drills included air intercept exercises and P-8A patrol aircraft coordination. This marked the first U.S.-Philippines joint patrol in the South China Sea of 2025, and also the first time the United States fully deployed a Carrier Strike Group to participate in an MCA. From November 14-15, a multilateral maritime cooperative activity (MMCA) was launched in waters adjacent to the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, with the participation of USS *Nimitz* CSG, destroyer JS *Akebono* from the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force, as well as frigates BRP *Jose Rizal* and BRP *Antonio Luna* of the Philippine Navy, patrol vessel BRP *Melchora Aquino* and BRP *Cape San Agustin* of the Philippine Coast Guard. Such activity aimed for maritime domain awareness, anti-submarine warfare, tactical coordination, etc.

[1] U.S. aircraft carrier heads west from South China Sea amid Middle East tensions, Reuters, June 16, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/U.S.-aircraft-carrier-heads-west-schina-sea-amid-middle-east-tensions-2025-06-16/

In recent years, the CSGs primarily maintained a unilateral presence and conducted independent training exercises in the South China Sea. In 2025, however, the USN's public dispatch of entire CSGs to participate in joint exercises under the MCA and MMCA manifests the core role played by the CSGs in deepening their involvement in multilateral coordinated drills.

Third, frequent accidents indicate that CSG operations are approaching the boundaries of safety. As the pressure of limited global deployment resources for the USN continues to grow, the maintenance periods for the carriers cannot keep pace with the high-intensity deployment requirements. Moreover, hull structures, carrier-based aircraft and service personnel are all faced with safety challenges, leading to a corresponding increase in the risk of accidents.

From 2017 to 2023, USS *George Washington* underwent its Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH), a mid-life maintenance process originally scheduled to take approximately 4 years to complete. However, labor shortages, budget uncertainties, supply chain disruptions and other negative factors caused by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic led the project to last for almost 6 years, rendering the carrier unavailable to relieve USS *Ronald Reagan* in the 7th Fleet on time. Likewise, the mid-life maintenance for USS *John C. Stennis* was planned to be completed in

August 2025, yet the expected time has already been postponed to October 2026 due to labor shortages, supply chain disruptions and the quality-of-life issues caused by the overhaul of USS *George Washington* (from 2017 to 2022, a total of 9 personnel on board committed suicide). Such prolonged delays indicate the practical pressure on the US carrier maintenance system and the significant problems in carrier repair projects.

Besides maintenance pressures, the frequency of accidents has also seen an increase when the CSGs are deployed in the Western Pacific. On January 27, as USS *Carl Vinson* was making a port call at Laem Chabang, 2 members of the CSG, namely the destroyer USS *William P. Lawrence* and the cruiser USS *Princeton*, collided with each other, causing damage to the superstructures on both ships. On April 19, a sailor from USS *Nimitz* went missing while the carrier berthed in Guam. The search efforts lasted for days and were finally suspended by officials, with an announcement that the sailor was "unaccounted for".[1]

On October 26, when USS *Nimitz* was deployed in the South China Sea, an F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter jet and an MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to the carrier crashed into the sea in 2 separate incidents. On October 27, President Donald Trump told the correspondents at a press

[1] Navy suspends Search for Missing USS Nimitz Sailor in Guam, U.S.NI News, April 24, 2025, https://news.U.S.ni.org/2025/04/24/navy-sU.S.pends-search-for-missing-U.S.s-nimitz-sailor-in-guam

conference that the Navy was investigating the fuel supply issue for the USS *Nimitz*, which could be the reason for the incidents. Such information was verified by 2 sources who are familiar with the preliminary investigation of the USN, believing that the contaminated fuel should be regarded as the major suspect for the crash, though the preliminary findings are far removed from the conclusion. A comprehensive investigation into the crashes has yet to be released.[1]



Figure 2: Tracks of USS Nimitz, Oct. 17-Nov. 17, 2025

In December 2025, the USN openly released the investigation report on 4 maritime incidents involving USS *Harry S. Truman* during its deployment between September 2024 and May 2025. According to the report, leadership failures, inadequate training and equipment malfunctions

[1] Navy Probes USS Nimitz Fuel Supply After Crashes, Trump Points to 'Bad Fuel', USNI News, October 27, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/10/27/navy-probes-uss-nimitz-fuel-supply-after-crashes-trump-points-to-bad-fuel

led to the loss of 3 F/A-18 fighter jets and the collision between the carrier and a merchant ship, all of which should have been avoided.[1]

2. Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs)

In 2025, the US deployed 2 ARGs in the Western Pacific, namely USS *America* (LHA-6) and USS *Tripoli* (LHA-7), but only the latter made a single entry into the South China Sea. Although this number has increased slightly compared to that of 2024, the shortfalls in amphibious readiness are still conspicuous.

The ARG is the premier three-ship formation of the Marine Corps, typically consisting of an amphibious assault ship (LHA), an amphibious transport dock (LPD), and a dock landing ship (LSD). However, in recent deployments, a multitude of maintenance issues have forced the Marine Corps to resort to piecemeal and suboptimal configurations. In 2024, equipment malfunctions caused the LHA USS *Boxer* to delay its deployment and miss scheduled exercises. Since only 1 LHA and 1 LSD were available for operations, USS *America* failed to be deployed as a fully constituted ARG in 2024.

[1] Investigations Show Failures Behind Carrier Harry S. Truman Collision, Loss of 3 Super Hornets, USNI News, December 4, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/12/04/investigations-show-failures-behind-carrier-harry-s-truman-collision-loss-of-3-super-hornets

As a part of the rotation plan for troops in the Pacific region, the LHA USS *America* returned to San Diego after 4 months of patrol in the combat region of the 7th Fleet, and was relieved by USS *Tripoli*. On November 28, USS *Tripoli* commenced its first forward-deployed patrol following its homeport shift. It entered the South China Sea via the Luzon Strait on December 5, visited Da Nang, Vietnam alongside the cruiser USS *Robert Smalls* on December 8, and departed the South China Sea via the Bashi Channel on February 16. During this operation, USS *Tripoli* embarked personnel from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), Amphibious Squadron 11 (PHIBRON 11), and Combined Task Force 76 (CTF 76), while the remaining ships of the ARG did not deploy alongside it.

Shelby Oakley from the US Government Accountability Office noted that as the US military force was preoccupied with the war in the Middle East, the condition of its amphibious fleets saw a steady decrease due to maintenance delays.[1] In April 2025, Eric Smith, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, indicated that approximately 50% of the amphibious ships were ready for deployment when crises or conflicts arose, which was far lower than the 80% target required by the Navy.[2] In May, Jim Kilby, the acting Chief of Naval Operations, acknowledged that "I owe you a three-

[1] Exclusive: Top US Marine says 'crisis' with amphibious ships causing coverage gaps, VOA News, March 10, 2025, https://www.voanews.com/a/exclusive-top-us-marine-says-crisis-with-amphibious-ships-causing-coverage-gaps/8004073.html

[2] Amphibious ships lagging behind Navy's 80% ready-to-deploy goal, Stars and Stripes, April 8, 2025, https://www.stripes.com/branches/marine_corps/2025-04-08/navy-marine-corps-amphibious-warships%C2%A0-17410851.html

ship ARG that's ready to embark Marines and conduct the training cycle and deploy on schedule. I do not meet that requirement".[1]

Similar to the situation of the CSGs, as the US military is deeply involved in the Middle East wars, its Marine Corps cannot uphold a consistent "3.0 ARG/MEU" state, which is equivalent to deploying a fully constituted ARG/MEU covering both coasts of the US homeland and Japan respectively. In reality, only a "1.0 ARG/MEU" can be delivered, leaving a deficit in response capabilities across the Indo-Pacific region.

3. Nuclear-powered Submarines

In 2025, the US has deployed at least 1 nuclear-powered guided missle submarine USS *Ohio* (SSGN-726), and 11 nuclear-powered attack submarines, including USS *Seawolf* (SSN-21), USS *Alexandria* (SSN-757), USS *Asheville* (SSN-758), USS *Annapolis* (SSN-760), USS *Springfield* (SSN-761), USS *Santa Fe* (SSN-763), USS *Tucson* (SSN-770), USS *Columbia* (SSN-771), USS *Greeneville* (SSN-772), USS *Missouri* (SSN-780), and USS *Vermont* (SSN-792). Based on the operational footprints of auxiliary vessels, US submarine activities spanned the entire Western Pacific, encompassing the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Java Sea.

[1] Navy, Marine Corps chiefs hammer amphib readiness in back-to-back addresses, Breaking Defense, May 2, 2025, https://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/navy-marine-corps-chiefs-hammer-amphib-readiness-in-back-to-back-addresses/

On April 9, USS *Emory S. Land* returned to its homeport at Apra Harbor, Guam, concluding a deployment of over 11 months. During this period, it conducted port visits to multiple countries, including Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore, to sustain the forward operations of undersea forces. On August 13, the submarine tender USS *Frank Cable* arrived in Banyuwangi, Indonesia, for a routine port visit.

Table 2: Activities of US Nuclear-powered Submarines in the South China Sea and Surrounding Areas in 2025

No.	Submarine	Home Port	Activity
1	USS *Ohio*	Bangor	Sep. 23, operated in Subic Bay;
2	USS *Seawolf*	Bangor	December, visited Yokosuka, Japan;
3	USS *Alexandria*	San Diego	Feb. 10, visited Busan;
4	USS *Asheville*	Guam	April, visited the White Beach Naval Facility of Okinawa, Japan; October, visited Pearl Harbor.; Nov. 18, returned to Guam;
5	USS *Annapolis*	Guam	Nov. 9, visited Yokosuka, Japan;
6	USS *Springfield*	Guam	May 15, visited Sasebo, Japan; Aug. 30, returned to Guam;
7	USS *Santa Fe*	Pearl Harbor	Jul. 1, visited Yokosuka, Japan; Jul. 22, visited Sasebo, Japan;
8	USS *Tucson*	Pearl Harbor	Jun. 1, visited Yokosuka, Japan; Oct. 12, docked in Guam;
9	USS *Columbia*	Pearl Harbor	Feb. 10, visited the White Beach Naval Facility of Okinawa, Japan;
10	USS *Greeneville*	San Diego	Sep. 9, visited Yokosuka, Japan;
11	USS *Missouri*	Pearl Harbor	Aug. 7, visited Yokosuka, Japan;
12	USS *Vermont*	Pearl Harbor	Mar. 16, returned to Pearl Harbor.

4. Bombers

According to open source information, the US Air Force (USAF) has dispatched a total of 13 sorties across 7 missions of B-52H and B-1B bombers to the Western Pacific region for patrol operations, seeing a decrease in both quantity and frequency compared to previous years.

Table 3: Activities of US Bombers in the South China Sea and Surrounding Areas in 2025

No.	Time	Bombers Model	Sortie
1	Jan. 15	B-1B	2
2	Feb. 4	B-1B (South China Sea)	2
3	Feb. 24	B-1B	1
4	Mar. 6	B-1B	2
5	Apr.16	B-1B	2
6	Nov. 7	B-1B	2
7	Dec. 10	B-52H	2

Notably, the US strategy for bomber employment in the Western Pacific is undergoing a structural shift. The B-1B Lancer strategic bombers have been deployed in a rotation mode, namely the “Bomber Task Force”, to the air bases in mainland Japan. This “Bomber Task Force” is not expected to conduct long-term deployments, but aims at maintaining bomber presence to guarantee consistent deterrence without establishing a fixed front-line base, through high-frequency and predictable rotations with time limits. For the US military, this means that the implementation of dispatching bombers in the Indo-Pacific region will no longer be

constrained by the strategic depth of Guam or the Indian Ocean, yet render Japan a routine springboard for operations. In April 2025, the B-1B bombers from the 9th expeditionary bomb squadron took off from Dyess Air Force Base in Texas, flew across the Pacific, and conducted joint exercises with the F-16 fighter jets of the US and F-35 and F-16 fighter jets from the ROK in the western airspace of the Korean Peninsula. In October 2025, a bomber task force consisting of 4 B-1B bombers was dispatched by the USAF from Dyess Air Force Base to the Misawa Air Base in Japan, and participated in multiple joint exercises within a month. Compared to the deployment in April, this operation has been more defined in terms of scale, period and the content of exercises, forging a fixed coordinated relationship with the F-35 fighter jets of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the F-16 fighter jets of the US.

II. Uneven Growth in Aerial and Maritime Close-in Reconnaissance

1. Aerial Close-in Reconnaissance

Based on incomplete statistics, in 2025, US reconnaissance aircraft conducted a cumulative total of approximately 1200 sorties in the South China Sea, representing a moderate increase compared to 2024, attributed primarily to drones and air bases in the Philippines. These reconnaissance missions were launched from multiple outposts, including Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Osan Air Base in the ROK, Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, and Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The aircraft involved the USN's P-8A anti-submarine patrol aircraft and the MQ-4C Triton unmanned air system; the USAF's RC-135 series electronic reconnaissance aircraft, E-3B airborne early warning and control aircraft, and MQ-9 Reaper drone; as well as the US Army's Airborne Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare System demonstrator aircraft (Global 6500), among others.



Figure 3: Close-in Reconnaissance Operations by US Large Aircraft in the South China Sea in 2025

The deployment of US reconnaissance aircraft exhibited distinct patterns across different phases of the year, as the number of sorties was higher in the beginning and the end of the year compared to the middle of the year, reaching an annual peak in November. The frequency of sorties would be significantly high under 2 conditions. First, this occurred when there were major changes involving the Chinese military deployments and activities. In November 2025, when the PLA Navy *Fujian* aircraft carrier departed from its homeport Sanya for the first time following its official commissioning to conduct military exercises in the South China Sea, the US military's focus on these developments escalated rapidly. Consequently, its close-in reconnaissance operations notably intensified, characterized by more frequent and bolder operational tactics. Specifically, from November 16 to 20, the US military launched approximately 5 sorties of

reconnaissance aircraft for operations in the South China Sea each day, and on November 17, the number rose to 7 sorties. On December 16, as the *Fujian* CSG transited the Taiwan Strait, the USAF dispatched RC-135W electronic reconnaissance aircraft for close-in reconnaissance. Second, this also happened when the US CSGs were conducting military activities in the South China Sea. Between October and November 2025, a time when USS *Nimitz* and USS *George Washington* were deployed in the South China Sea respectively, at least 3 to 4 reconnaissance aircraft would be dispatched daily to implement coordinated operations.



Figure 4: Reconnaissance Operations by USAF RC-135W in the Taiwan Strait on December 16 2025

The US reconnaissance aircraft's reliance on Philippine bases is prominently on the rise. Traditionally, aerial reconnaissance operations of the US military in the South China Sea primarily originated from the Kadena Air Base, transiting through the Bashi Channel to conduct missions

in the airspace over the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. In recent years, as the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets of the US military were consistently deployed to forward bases in the Philippines, together with the escalating frictions between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, the number of reconnaissance sorties launched directly from Philippine air bases to the South China Sea has increased annually. In 2025, the maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft P-8A and MQ-9 deployed in the Philippines maintained a daily frequency of 1 to 2 sorties, conducting reconnaissance operations toward Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands, totaling approximately 450 sorties for the year and accounting for 38% of the total number of US military reconnaissance missions in the South China Sea. In comparison to Kadena Air Base, the location of the Clark Air base in the Philippines is closer to the hotspot areas of the South China Sea, boasting significant advantages in terms of geographic adjacency. Such changes not only shortened the flying times and flight distances, but also elevated the efficiency and flexibility of the US military to conduct high-frequency and sustained reconnaissance over focal regions in the South China Sea, so as to intensify their overall capability in intelligence gathering and maritime domain awareness.

Moreover, the deployment and utilization of unmanned reconnaissance platforms by the US military in the South China Sea and

its surrounding areas have been intensified continuously, and the reconnaissance sorties conducted in the South China Sea account for 30% of the total US close-in reconnaissance operations over China. It is expected that large unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) may even operate on par with large manned reconnaissance aircraft. Represented by medium- and high-altitude long-endurance (MALE/HALE) UAVs such as the MQ-4C Triton and the MQ-9 Reaper, these platforms have become the core pillar supporting the forward deployment of ISR assets within the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy", leveraging their long-range loitering capabilities, modular sensor systems, and low-risk, high-frequency sortie characteristics. Since March 2023, under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed in 2014, MQ-9s have maintained rotational deployments at Basa Air Base in the Philippines. Furthermore, on April 8, 2025, Japan's Ministry of Defense announced that the temporary deployment of US MQ-4C UAVs at Kadena Air Base would be transitioned to an indefinite deployment.[1]

[1] US Triton UAVs to deploy from Japan, Asia Military Review, April 17, 2025, https://www.asianmilitaryreview.com/2025/04/us-triton-uavs-to-deploy-from-japan-foc/



Figure 5: Reconnaissance Operations by USN MQ-4C in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea in April 2025

2. Maritime Close-in Reconnaissance

In 2025, the US military deployed 4 ocean surveillance ships to the South China Sea: USNS *Victorious* (T-AGOS-19), USNS *Able* (T-AGOS-20), USNS *Effective* (T-AGOS-21), and USNS *Impeccable* (T-AGOS-23), alongside 3 oceanographic survey ships: USNS *Bowditch* (T-AGS-62), USNS *Henson* (T-AGS-63), and USNS *Mary Sears* (T-AGS-65). Their cumulative operational time in the South China Sea amounted to 197 ship-days. Among them, the ocean surveillance ship USNS *Victorious* was the most active of all the reconnaissance vessels, operating for 55 days.



Figure 6: Tracks of USNS Victorious in 2025

In 2025, the deployment time of US ocean surveillance ships in the South China Sea decreased significantly, resulting in a “coverage gap” for nearly half of the year. The ocean surveillance ships spent the majority of their time docked at Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan. Notably, in mid-March, 5 of these ships were simultaneously idled at a Yokohama pier, indicative of their overextended capacity and operational strain. Meanwhile, the operational focus of the oceanographic survey ships shifted to the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula and the broader North Pacific region.



Figure 7: 5 Ocean Surveillance Ships Docked at a Yokohama Port Simultaneously in mid-March 2025

In consideration of the operational scope, a triangular area bounded by the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, the Bashi Channel and the east-west sea lanes of the South China Sea remained the primary focus for surveillance operations. Meanwhile, the operational footprint of oceanographic survey ships such as USNS *Bowditch* primarily covered key maritime passages within the Philippine archipelago, such as the Mindoro Strait and the Balabac Strait, which serve as the critical transit corridors into and out of the South China Sea.

The ocean surveillance capability of the USN is undergoing a crucial period of transition, during which outdated fleets will be replaced by a new generation of surveillance systems. On the one hand, ocean surveillance and oceanographic survey ships are facing severely aging, with a continuous decline in their reliability and efficiency; on the other hand, the US is promoting a plan to build the *Explorer*-class ships, with an aim to recover its structural advantage in global underwater surveillance. As of 2025, among the 5 active ocean surveillance ships, with the exception of the Impeccable, which has been in service for over 24 years, and the remaining four of *Victorious*-class have all exceeded 30 years of service, clearly entering the late stages of their operational lifespans. Meanwhile, the majority of active-duty oceanographic survey ships have approached or surpassed the 30-year mark, making platform aging an equally serious issue across this fleet.

To address the current situation of aging fleets, the USN, even in the face of budgetary constraints and the continuous reduction in the construction of other vessels, resolved to build a new series of ocean surveillance ships to enhance its maritime surveillance capability. Based on the introduction of the *Navy TAGOS-25 Ocean Surveillance Shipbuilding Program* submitted by the USN to Congress in September 2025, the T-AGOS 25, officially designated as the Explorer-class, was described as a new generation of ocean surveillance ship, and would

replace the current 5 active-duty ships. The new ship is expected to outperform the legacy ships in terms of platform reliability, endurance and maintenance cycles, and is designed to better adapt to the requirements of future distributed hydroacoustic sensor networks and the multi-domain operations. However, as revealed by the FY2025 budget submission, the advancement of such a plan still faced schedule adjustments. For instance, the procurement of the second ship has already been delayed from FY2025 to FY2026.[1]

Looking ahead, the modernization of the USN's ocean surveillance capability is shifting from a singular reliance on aging manned platform to a multi-layered, more flexible modern vessel system. While the latest Explorer-class surveillance ships have yet to reach full operational capability, they hold crucial potential for the reconstitution of global hydroacoustic surveillance and anti-submarine warfare intelligence assets.

[1] Report to Congress on TAGOS-25 Ocean Surveillance Shipbuilding Program, USNI News, January 28,2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/01/28/report-to-congress-on-tagos-25-ocean-surveillance-shipbuilding-program

III. Low-frequency Declaratory Operations

1. Island-Intrusive Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)

In 2025, the US military conducted only 2 public island-intruding FONOPs, the same as in 2024, showing a general decline compared to previous years. However, other types of FONOPs have not diminished. In August 2025, the US Department of Defense released the *FY24 Freedom of Navigation Report*, which detailed challenges to 19 "excessive maritime claims" by 11 countries or regions. Among these, China faced the most challenges and was the only claimant contested in multiple maritime zones, with five challenges in total (four targeting mainland China and one targeting Taiwan). This highlights the sustained strategic focus of US FONOPs on China.



Figure 8: The Number of Times USN Intrusions into the Territorial or Adjacent Waters of China Stationed Features in the South China Sea, 2015-2025

There were two FONOPs near Chinese-garrisoned islands and reefs in the South China Sea. On May 12, USS *Dewey* intruded into the waters near the Spratly Islands. The U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet stated that "this freedom of navigation operation ... challenged restrictions on innocent passage imposed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam."[1] On August 13, just two days after a collision between China Coast Guard and Chinese Navy vessels near the area, USS *Higgins* entered the territorial waters of Scarborough Shoal. This marked the first USN FONOP near Scarborough Shoal since 2019.

Following the operation, the 7th Fleet spokesperson, Lt. Sarah Merrill, denied China's claim of expelling the US warship which was conducting FONOP, stating that the operation challenged China's requirement for foreign warships to seek prior approval for innocent passage in its territorial waters.[2]

In 2025, the confirmed number of US island-intruding FONOPs was only two, far below the historical average. Unlike the broader coverage of previous years, these operations primarily targeted the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, conspicuously bypassing the Paracel Islands. The US

[1] US Warship Challenged Beijing's South China Sea Claims, Navy Says, Newsweek, June 02, 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/us-news-warship-challenged-beijing-south-china-sea-claims-2079721

[2] U.S. Navy Holds South China Sea FONOP at Scarborough Shoal, Naval News, August 13, 2025, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/08/u-s-navy-holds-south-china-sea-fonop-at-scarborough-shoal/

military refrained from issuing official statements regarding these operations, signaling a low-profile, infrequent, and targeted approach.

2. Taiwan Strait Transits

Throughout 2025, US warships transited the Taiwan Strait three times, each accompanied by high-profile public statements. The year represents a continuation of the downward trend in transits since 2020, with five in 2024, six in 2023, nine in 2022, and 12 in 2021.



Figure 9: The Number of Times US Warships Transited the Taiwan Strait, 2007-2025

From "frequent deterrence" to "infrequent presence". Since 2020, the frequency of US warships transiting the Taiwan Strait has decreased annually with longer intervals between operations, dropping from one to two times per month to approximately one per quarter.

On February 10, USS *Ralph Johnson* and USNS *Bowditch* transited the Taiwan Strait, marking the first joint transit involving both a combat ship (destroyer) and a non-combat research vessel (oceanographic survey ship), emphasizing intelligence collection and reconnaissance rather than pure provocation or deterrence. Also, there were no official announcements from the US military about the transits this year.

Table 4: US Warships Transited the Taiwan Strait in 2025

No.	Date	Warship
1	Feb. 10	USS *Ralph Johnson* (destroyer), USNS *Bowditch* (oceanographic survey ship)
2	Apr. 23	USS *William P. Lawrence* (destroyer)
3	Sep. 12	USS *Higgins* (destroyer), HMS *Richmond* (frigate)

Suspended reconnaissance aircraft transits. Deployed to the Western Pacific in 2013 and conducted its first transit in 2021, the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft P-8A, which had maintained an annual frequency of three to five transits since 2021, did not conduct any publicly confirmed transit operations in 2025.

Unlike the high-frequency transits and accompanying public hype seen since 2018, US operations in 2025 were less frequent and declaratory but more routine. This aligns with the policy shift during Trump's second term, emphasizing "America First" and trade negotiations. Furthermore, concurrent with U.S. actions against Iran in the Middle East, its military resources and priorities have been adjusted accordingly.

IV. Continuously Boosted Joint Operations with Allies

The US and its allies have significantly accelerated the construction of a military network in the South China Sea region. Leveraging the Philippines as a strategic node, the US has attempted to integrate regional allies into its military system through strengthened infrastructure deployment, expanded forward deployments, and enhanced intelligence and technological cooperation.

1. Strengthening Infrastructure and Forward Deployments

In 2025, the US continued to regard the Philippines as a critical node in its South China Sea military network. First, it accelerated upgrades and expansions at multiple Philippine bases under the framework of *Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement* (EDCA). These upgrades included runway extensions, hangar expansions, fuel storage, ammunition support facilities, and the addition of communication nodes and prepositioned logistics capabilities. In March 2025, during Exercise Salaknib, the US Army 84th Engineer Battalion collaborated with the Philippine Army 522nd Engineer Battalion to upgrade approximately 792 meters of road, including pavement reinforcement and drainage system optimization, to support the passage of heavy military vehicles. Second, within the framework of *Mutual Defense Treaty* (MDT), the US and the Philippines

continuously strengthened the military presence via frequent joint drills and institutional dialogues. For example, they conducted live fire exercise on Palawan Island including High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) live fire training, enhanced long-range strike capabilities toward the South China Sea, and quickly endowed the Philippines infrastructure with real combat capabilities. In March 2025, the US Defense Secretary issued a joint statement with the Philippine Defense Secretary during his visit, reaffirming their MDT commitments with plans to deploy advanced weapons systems and conduct joint training in more complex scenarios. They also published a bilateral defense industrial cooperation vision statement to promote defense industrial cooperation and further the co-production of unmanned systems and enhanced logistical support.[1] Third, strengthening forward deployments of critical equipment and facilities like missiles. In April 2025, the USMC deployed the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) to the Philippines for Balikatan 2025 and Kamandag 2025. In June, according to the House Appropriations Committee's defense subcommittee report on the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026, to address the lack of a forward-staged ammunition manufacturing facility in the Indo-Pacific, the Committee

[1] United States–Philippines Joint Statement on Secretary Hegseth's Inaugural Visit to the Philippines, U.S. Department of War, March 28, 2025, https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4137869/united-statesphilippines-joint-statement-on-secretary-hegseths-inaugural-visit/

directed the Department of Defense to assess, in coordination with the Department of State and the International Development Finance Corporation, the feasibility of establishing a joint ammunition manufacturing and storage facility at Subic Bay.[1] Philippine National Security Advisor Eduardo Año confirmed that the Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile system had been deployed in the Philippines with mobile relocation capabilities. Bearing a range of thousands of kilometers, the system provides substantial coverage over the South China Sea and surrounding areas. Its deployment has shifted the Philippines' role within the regional military system from a primarily defensive posture to one capable of regional support and deterrence.

In addition to the strengthened bilateral cooperation between the US and the Philippines, there has been an emerging network of forward deployment involving multiple countries.

U.S. allies and partners such as Japan, Australia, Canada, and France sent their naval and air forces frequently into the South China Sea for joint or multilateral military activities with the US. This dynamic has forged a U.S.-centric forward operational network that is tightly coordinated among its allies and partners.

[1] Congress Eyes Ammunition Plant at former U.S. Naval Base in the Philippines, USNI News, June 24, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/06/24/congress-eyes-ammunition-plant-at-former-u-s-naval-base-in-the-philippines

In May 2025, during a quadrilateral defense ministers' meeting in Singapore, ministers of Japan, the US, Australia, and the Philippines agreed to enhance the Philippines' defense capabilities through joint training, equipment assistance, and intelligence cooperation, emphasizing coordinated air and maritime activities in the South China Sea.[1]

2. Advancing Intelligence Technology and Situational Awareness Cooperation

In 2025, the US and its allies further institutionalized and expanded intelligence-sharing mechanisms in the South China Sea, with a particular focus on multilateral frameworks among the US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. On May 31, during the defense ministers' meeting, the four countries agreed to develop joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plans and enhance cybersecurity and information systems to enable real-time intelligence sharing and coordination.[1] Meanwhile, the US has been assisting the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia in maritime law enforcement and surveillance training, aimed at enhancing capabilities of maritime patrol, target identification, and information relay, exploiting intelligence systems on multi-layer spanning military activities, maritime law enforcement and fisheries management. On November 1st, during a meeting with ASEAN defense ministers, the US

[1] Joint Statement on the Meeting of Defense Ministers From Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States, U.S. Department of War, May 31, 2025, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2025-05-31/joint-statement-meeting-defense-ministers-from-australia-japan-philippines-united-states

proposed the establishment of a joint maritime monitoring and rapid response system, focusing on the creation of a “shared maritime domain awareness” network to improve regional early warning and coordinated action.

The US and its allies demonstrated an increasingly coordinated development trend in air and maritime intelligence networks. In May 2025, the defense ministers of the US, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines issued a joint statement acknowledging the importance of information sharing in establishing Common Operational Pictures (COPs) in the South China Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific region. Following the signing of the bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between the US and the Philippines in 2024, Australia and Japan planned to engage in bilateral discussions with the Philippines for similar agreements. They reiterated that such efforts would promote broader information sharing and analysis, including the establishment of a joint information center. During the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in October 2025 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the establishment of “Task Force Philippines” was announced. Comprising approximately 60 military personnel and led by a US one-star general stationed in the Philippines, the force is responsible for coordinating bilateral activities in the South China Sea, including joint patrols, real-time intelligence sharing, and crisis

response. [1] Furthermore, in 2025, the U.S. Marine Corps' Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 (VMU-1) was deployed to Basa Air Base, Philippines, equipped with MQ-9A Reaper drones to enhance maritime domain awareness capabilities of the US and the Philippines in the South China Sea. The US-Philippines cooperation in regional maritime domain awareness and ISR reflects the US strategic intent to leverage unmanned systems to strengthen collective monitoring and early warning under the Indo-Pacific security framework.[2] The integration of US P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, high-altitude unmanned reconnaissance platforms, as well as the naval and air forces of allies in situational awareness activities has become increasingly normalized.

[1] U.S. Unveils Philippine Task Force to Deter Chinese Coercion, USNI News, October 31, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/10/31/u-s-unveils-philippine-task-force-to-deter-chinese-coercion
[2] U.S. Marines Deploy Drone Unit to Philippines to Patrol Over South China Sea, November 13, 2025, https://news.usni.org/2025/11/13/u-s-marines-deploy-drone-unit-to-philippines-to-patrol-over-south-china-sea

V. Upgraded Multi-Domain Joint Exercises

According to preliminary tracking, in 2025, the US military maintained a high intensity of exercises in the South China Sea and surrounding areas (extending east to the Philippine Sea and south to Australia), conducting a total of 122 large-scale exercises. These included 6 unilateral exercises and 116 bilateral or multilateral exercises, involving forces from the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Army, Space Force, and Coast Guard, demonstrating a typical characteristic of "all-domain integration". Japan ranked first with 71 times, followed by the Philippines for 32. The participation of multiple European countries also increased significantly. The exercises have indicated the US strategy of strengthening the Indo-Pacific security network and counterbalancing China's regional influence through multilateral frameworks.

1. Expanded Alliance and Strengthened Multilateral Efforts

Faced with increasingly limited resources, the US military has significantly increased joint exercises in the region with both regional and extra-regional allies.

The US military was deeply involved in exercises led by European powers. From February 10 to 18, France led Pacific Steller 2025 in waters east of the Philippines. Participating forces included USS *Carl Vinson*, JS

Kaga, and FS *Charles de Gaulle*. The exercise featured dual/triple carrier coordination, cross-deck operations of F/A-18 and Rafale-M fighter jets, and air/anti-submarine warfare. This marked the first time a French carrier conducted large-scale cross-deck operations with a US carrier in the Indo-Pacific and led a multinational carrier-level exercise in the region. The exercise emphasized seamless interoperability with the US military, with its scope extended directly to the edge of the South China Sea. For the first time, France—as the only European power operating a non-U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier—deeply participated in U.S. military operations in the South China Sea. From April 21 to May 9, the US and the Philippines co-led Exercise Balikatan 2025 in and around Philippine waters, with the Japan Self-Defense Force participating for the first time as a formal participant rather than an observer previously. Additionally, four European countries, namely Czechia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Poland, participated as observers for the first time in this series of exercises, marking broader European engagement in South China Sea-related exercises.

From July 13 to August 4, Talisman Sabre 2025 dominated by the US and Australia set a new benchmark for multilateral scale. The exercise covered the Australian mainland and Papua New Guinea, with a strategic depth exceeding 6,500 kilometers. Over 40,000 personnel, 40 warships, and 350 aircraft from 19 countries involved. The UK's HMS *Prince of*

Wales joined the exercise for the first time, conducting dual-carrier operations with USS *George Washington* in the Timor Sea. Two F-35B fighter jets from the USMC VMFA-242 operated aboard HMS *Prince of Wales* for takeoff, refueling, and launch operations. Aircraft from both carriers, including USS *George Washington* CVW-5's F/A-18E/F fighters and HMS *Prince of Wales*' F-35Bs, carried out joint flight exercises to validate interoperability and joint tactical execution.

From October 6 to 17, the US and the Philippines co-hosted Exercise Sama Sama 2025 together in the western Philippines. Italy participated as an observer for the first time, joining the UK and France, further expanding the exercise beyond its traditionally Asia-Pacific-centric scope.

2. Deepened Integration of Multi-Domain Data and Factors

Unlike past exercises that weighed more on traditional joint operations, US military drills in 2025 emphasized the integration of factors such as unmanned systems, long-range firepower, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence, reflecting a shift toward high-end warfare.

For the first time, Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025 systematically incorporated AI-assisted decision-making and cross-domain ISR integration. Lockheed Martin showcased its next-generation fire application, connecting battalion-level command nodes with systems like

Mid-Range Capability (MRC) and HIMARS to enable rapid "kill chain" closure. BigBear.ai implemented real-time orchestration of sensors and firepower units through the Conductor OS platform to improve situational awareness and decision-making efficiency. Sim Centric integrated weather and risk data to enhance battlefield visualization. These technologies highlighted the US military's efforts to draw commercial tech companies into operational experimentation, accelerating the implementation of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).

During Exercise Balikatan 2025, the US deployed NMESIS and MADIS for the first time in the Philippines to Batan Island, covering critical sea lanes in the Bashi Channel and demonstrating "sea denial" and key area denial capabilities. Multi-domain task forces conducted training of drones, high-altitude balloons, and electronic warfare, while the MARTAC T38 *Devil Ray* unmanned surface vessel operated discreetly in Subic Bay. Thanks to its low deployment requirements, high stealth, and semi-submersible capabilities, unmanned surface platforms significantly enhanced forward sensing and asymmetric strike potential.

From September 12 to 25, amid the US and Japan's Resolute Dragon 2025, the US military deployed Typhon to Japan for the first time, along with NMESIS and MADIS systems to Ishigaki Island near the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. This deployment delivered a distributed, land-

based firepower strategy to bolster First Island Chain defenses. Overall, 2025 exercises transformed from basic force coordination to modular validation and practical deployment of integrated operational capabilities.

3. Scenario-Based Exercises Centered on South China Sea Hotspots

Unlike the previous broad "Pan-Pacific" frameworks, in 2025, exercises targeted specific South China Sea hotspots, focusing on sensitive areas like Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Shoal, and strategic straits, with scenario-based crisis response replacing symbolic displays.

In January, France organized the fifth La Pérouse around the Indonesian archipelago. Instead of staging in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific like previous iterations, this exercise focused on the Lombok, Malacca, and Sunda Straits. Connecting the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, and Pacific, these straits possess immense strategic significance. Nine countries, including France, the US, Australia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the UK, participated with 13 vessels and submarines, and approximately 130 aircraft. The exercise highlighted maritime surveillance, interception, air operations, progressive training and information sharing to enhance regional maritime security.

Exercise Balikatan 2025 featured scenarios of amphibious and maritime invasions, with Philippine, US, and Australian forces conducting

a high-intensity simulated airport seizure exercise in southern Palawan Island. The island was modeled as a complex maritime zone with simulated adversaries; the design closely mirrored realistic friction scenarios.

In April, the USAF Reaper Smoke 2025 at home used MQ-9A Reaper drones for maritime operations. Reports indicated the exercise "clearly implied the possibility of high-level war with China in the Far East",[1] showing the growing demand for MQ-9 capabilities in the Indo-Pacific and their importance in countering near-peer challenges. Through dual-front training at home and abroad, the US gradually built a reserve of long-range unmanned combat capabilities for the Indo-Pacific.

Overall, in 2025, US military exercises in the South China Sea and surrounding areas have 3 major characteristics. First, unprecedented multilateralization with European powers embedded deeply into the Indo-Pacific security architecture. Second, extensive integration of technology and unmanned systems as land-based long-range firepower became central. Third, focused on specific South China Sea hotspots and transitioned from broad demonstrations to targeted deterrence. Strategically, these exercises were aimed at shaping regional military superiority in long-term competition with China through alliance integration and the development

[1] USAF MQ-9 Reapers Prepare for Maritime Operations in the Indo-Pacific with Exercise Reaper Smoke, The Aviationist, May 24, 2025, https://theaviationist.com/2025/05/24/usaf-mq-9-reapers-maritime-operations-reaper-smoke/#deny

of integrated combat capabilities, and establishing sustained presence as well as rapid response capabilities at critical nodes throughout the South China Sea.

VI.Summary and Outlook

In 2025, US military activities in the South China Sea continued to show varying degrees of increase and decrease. However, the operations of carrier strike groups (CSGs), amphibious ready groups (ARGs), and ocean surveillance ships were noticeably constrained by other hotspots, such as the Middle East and the Caribbean Sea. These deployments were further hindered by constraints within the US defense industrial base, particularly the shipbuilding sector, resulting in evident operational fatigue. This dynamic is expected to persist as the US military maintains its prolonged operational tempo in the Middle East.

On the other hand, the growth in operations brought by unmanned platforms has been significant. For instance, within the realm of aerial close-in reconnaissance, sorties conducted by large unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the South China Sea now account for 30 percent of total aerial reconnaissance sorties targeting China. Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) and High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) platforms, such as the MQ-4C *Triton* and MQ-9 *Reaper*, deployed in Okinawa, Japan, and Clark Air Base, the Philippines, have become the primary drivers of this increased reconnaissance activities. This is largely due to their extended loitering capabilities, modular sensor suites, and ability to sustain high-frequency, low-risk operations.

Looking ahead, regardless of strategic adjustments by the second Trump administration or the evolution of other global hotspots like the Middle East, the broader Asia-Pacific region, particularly the South China Sea, will remain the US military's most critical strategic theater. The US will undoubtedly strive to sustain its military presence and activities in and around the South China Sea. Under the "autopilot" mode, frontline US military operations may become increasingly aggressive and provocative. This introduces uncertainties into the relatively restrained military-to-military interactions observed between China and the United States since the November 2023 San Francisco summit, and threatens to undermine ongoing efforts by senior leadership on both sides to promote bilateral constructive strategic stability.

Appendix

Main U.S. Military Exercises in the South China Sea and Neighboring Areas in 2025

NO.	NAME	DATE	LOCATION	PARTICIPANT	FORCE	SUBJECT
1	Bilateral Exercise	1.8-11	South China Sea	U.S., Canada	U.S. : USS Higgins Canada: HMCS Ottawa	Maritime communications training and dynamic coordinated maneuvering
2	Trilateral Training	1.15	East China Sea	U.S., Japan, South Korea	U.S. : 2 B-1Bs, 1 F-16 Japan: 4 F-2s South Korea: 2 F-15Ks	Tactical training
3	Bilateral Training	1.15	Japan Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S. : 2 B-1Bs Japan: 4 F-15s	Tactical training
4	Maritime Cooperative Activity (MCA)	1.17-18	South China Sea	U.S., the Philippines	U.S. : USS Carl Vinson CSG and a U.S. Navy P-8A the Philippine: BRP Andrés Bonifacio and BRP Antonio Luna	Tactical exercises
5	La Perouse 2025	1.16-26	Indian Ocean	U.S., Australia, India, U.K., Canada, Malaysia	U.S. : USS Savannah Australia: HMAS Hobart Canada: HMCS Ottawa India: INS Mumbai Malaysia: KD Lekir and KD Gagah Samudera U.K.: HMS Spey Singapore: RSS Independence	Maritime surveillance, interdiction, and air operations through progressive training and information sharing
6	Bilateral Exercise	1.21-30	Okinawa	U.S., Japan	U.S. : MC-130J, HH-60, MV-22 Japan: US-2, U-125A, UH-60J	Search and Rescue exercise
7	Bilateral Training	1.22、24	Okinawa	U.S., Japan	U.S. : F-22, E-3, KC-135, HH-60W, MC-130s, HC-130, MV-22 Japan: 24xF-15s, 2xT-4s, 1xE-2C, 2xE-767, 1xU-125A, 2xUH-60Js	Tactical training

8	Sentry Aloha 25-1	1.29-2.12	Hawaii	U.S.	U.S. : F-35C, F-22A and KC-135	Dissimilar Air Combat Training, simulated combat exercises
9	Mine Warfare Exercise	2.1-10	Japan	U.S., Japan	U.S. : EODMU5, EODT, UUV operaters Japan: FFM , MST, MSO, MSC, SS, MCH-101	Mine Warfare (Mine Laying, Mine Sweeping, Mine Hunting and EOD)
10	Cope North 25	2.3-21	Guam	U.S., Japan, Australia	The United States Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), United States Marine Corps (USMC), United States Navy (USN), and Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) will fly approximately 85 F-35As and F-35Bs, and a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) contingent of 275 aviators, eight F-35As, a KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport and an E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft.	Tactical training
11	Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity (MMCA)	2.5	South China Sea	U.S., Japan, Australia, the Philippines	U.S. : USS Benfold, P-8A Australia: HMAS Hobart, MH-60R the Philippine: BRP Jose Rizal Japan: JS Akizuki, SH-60K	Tactical exercises
12	Unilateral exercise	2.6	Japan	U.S.	U.S. : 4xC-130J	Airdrop operation
13	Joint Combined Operation	2.6-7	South China Sea	U.S., Australia, U.K.	U.S. : USS Benfold Australia: HMAS Hobart U.K.: HMS Spey	Link exercise, coordinated maneuvering exercise, and a variety of other combined operations

14	Pacific Steller 2025	2.8-2.18	Philippine Sea	U.S., Japan, France	U.S. : USS Carl Vinson, USS Princeton, USS Sterett and USS William P. Lawrence, USNS Tippecanoe, USNS Charles Drew and a P-8A Japan: JS Kaga, JS Akizuki and a P-3C France: FS Charles De Gaulle, FS Forbin ,FS Provence and FS Alsace and FS Jacques Chevallier	Tactical Exercise (Anti-Air Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, LINKEX, Cross Deck etc.), and PHOTOEX.
15	Bilateral Exercise (ILEX25)	2.9-10	Sulu Sea、South China Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S. : USS Dewey Japan: JS Asahi	Dynamic maneuvering and communications drills
16	MMCA	2.12	South China Sea	U.S., Canada, the Philippines	Canada: HMCS Ottawa the Philippine: BRP Andrés Bonifacio , Beechcraft King Air C90 aircraft, and Philippine Air Force Search and Rescue (SAR) assets	Communication Check Exercises (COMMEX), Division Tactics (DIVTACS), Photo Exercise (PHOTOEX), and Expandable Mobile Anti-Submarine Training Target Exercise (EMATTEX).
17	Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo 2025 (MNEK)	2.16-22	Indonesia	38 countries including the U.S., Indonesia, India, Russia, France, U.K., Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Vietnam, and Italy.	U.S. : USS Deway Japan: JS Asahi India: INS Shardul France: FS Vendemiaire Australia: HMAS Hobart U.K.: HMS Spey Singapore: RSS Valour and RSS Fortitude the Philippines: BRP Ramon Alcaraz Thailand: HTMS Pattani	SAREX, Tactical Maneuvering Exercise, PHOTOEX and International Fleet Review, etc.

					Malaysia: KD Kelantan and KD Selangor Vietnam: VPNS HQ-09 Italy: ITS Antonio Marceglia	
18	Bilateral Exercise	2.17-3.22	the Philippines	U.S., the Philippines	U.S.: 1st Multi-Domain Task Force the Philippines: Approximately 6,000 soldiers	Joint weapons training exercise
19	Iron Fist 25	2.19-3.7	Okinawa	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USS America, USS Rushmore, USS John L. Canley, USS Warrior, LCU Japan: JS Kunisaki, JS Awaji, JS Chichijima, LCAC	Amphibious exercises, PHOTOEX, etc.
20	Bilateral Training	2.20	Japan Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: 7xF-16s Japan: 4xF-35As	Tactical exercises
21	Synthetic Training-Joint 25-71 (Resilient Shield)	2.24-27	Japan	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USS Higgins , USS Benfold and USS Shoup Japan: JS Ashigara and JS Kongo	Computer-generated training
22	Cobra Gold 2025 (CG25)	2.25-3.7	Thailand	U.S., Thailand, Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South of Korea	U.S.: over 3,000 U.S. personnel, including U.S. Marines from MRF-SEA, and other Marine Corps units	Command and control exercise, humanitarian civic assistance projects, and a field training exercise
23	Bilateral Exercise	2.27-3.1	East China Sea to West Pacific	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USS Carl Vinson, USS Willian P Lawrence, USS Steret, USS Ralph Johnson Japan: JS Harusame	Tactical Exercises (LINKEX and others)
24	Bilateral Training	3.6	East China Sea、Japan Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: 1xB-1B Japan: 4xF-15s, 3xF-15s, 4x F-2s, 4xF-15s	Tactical training
25	Freedom Shield 25	3.10-20	Yellow Sea	U.S., South Korea	U.S.: 2x F-35As,1xF-35C South Korea: 2xF-35As	Air integration training

26	Multilateral Exercise	3.4，3.6	Japan	U.S., Japan, New Zealand	U.S.: P-8A Japan: P-1,P-3C New Zealand: P-8A	Tactical Exercise (Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise, Information Exchange Exercise)
27	Sea Dragon 2025	3.4-18	Guam	U.S., Australia, India, Japan, South Korea	U.S. : 2xP-8A Australia: P-8A Japan: P-1 Korea: P-3 India: P-8I Neptune.	Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise
28	Trilateral Naval Exercise	3.17-20	East China Sea	U.S., Japan, South Korea	U.S.: USS Carl Vinson, USS Princeton, USS Sterett and USS William P. Lawrence Japan: JS Ikazuchi South Korea: ROKS Sejong the Great and ROKS Dae Jo-yeong	Group sails, advanced maritime communications, maritime interdiction operations training, air combat drills, staff exchanges
29	Cope Tiger 2025	3.17-28	Thailand	U.S., Thailand, Singapore	the U.S. Air Force, Royal Thai Air Force and the Republic of Singapore Air Force	Flying Training Exercise
30	Bilateral Exercise	3.21	East China Sea to West Pacific	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USS Carl Vinson, USS Willian P Lawrence, USS Steret, USS Princeton Japan: JS Ikazuchi	Tactical Exercises (LINKEX and others)
31	Salaknib 2025	3.24-4.11, 5.15-7.20	the Philippines	U.S., the Philippines	Nearly 650 personnel from the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, Philippine Armed Forces, and civilian partner agencies	Humanitarian assistance, information operations and counterintelligence training

32	MMCA	3.28	South China Sea	U.S., Japan, the Philippines	U.S.: USS Shoup, P-8A the Philippine: BRP Jose Rizal , C-90 aircraft Japan: JS Noshiro	Tactical exercises
33	Marine Exercise (MAREX) 25	3.31-4.11	the Philippines	U.S., the Philippines	U.S. Marines with 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, Marine Rotational Force – Darwin 25.3 and the Philippine Marine Corps	Amphibious operations, tactical training, and combat marksmanship
34	Tiger TRIUMPH 2025	4.1-13	India	U.S., India	U.S.: USS Comstock, USS Ralph Johnson	Amphibious exercise
35	Bilateral Training	4.3	Okinawa	U.S., Japan	U.S.: EA-18G Japan: JS Inazuma, EP-3 and OP-3C , UP-3D	Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare Exercise
36	Korean Spring Exercise	4.7-16	South Korea	U.S., South Korea	U.S.: personnel from Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit (EODMU) 5, 2x MH-53E South Korea: ROKS Ganggyeong and ROKS Gimhwa, ROKS Yangyang and ROKS Hongseong, ROKS Wonsan, ROKS Cheonghaejin, one submarine, one MH-60 helicopter and two explosive ordnance disposal companies	Combined Mine Warfare Exercise

37	SALVEX Korea 2025	4.7-4.11	South Korea	U.S., South Korea	U.S. Navy divers from Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit (MDSU) 1 and their counterparts from the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN)	SALVEX
38	Unilateral exercise	4.24	Philippine Sea	U.S.	U.S.: USS Nimitz CSG	Flight evolutions
39	Bilateral Exercise	4.7-11	Guam	U.S., Japan	U.S.: EOD Mobile Unit 5 (EODMU5) Japan: Mine Warfare Force EOD Unit	MCM and EOD training
40	Bilateral Exercise	4.7-25	Philippine Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USS Dewey, USS Shoup, USS Milius, USS Benfold, USNS Carl Brashear Japan: JS Ashigara	Tactical Exercise (Anti-Air Warfare Exercise, Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise, Anti-Surface Warfare Exercise, Electronic Warfare Exercise, Anti-Air Missile Exercise), and Replenishment at sea
41	Cope Thunder 25-1	4.7-18	the Philippines	U.S., the Philippines	Roughly 1700 service members from across the joint-combined forces, including USAF, PAF, and for the first time, the U.S. Marine Corps.	Bilateral fighter training
42	Balikatan 2025	4.21-5.9	the Philippines	U.S., Philippines, Australia, Japan (19 observer countries including the U.K., France, Canada, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Netherlands, Germany, India, Indonesia, etc.)	At least 14,000 troops (9,000 from the U.S. and 5,000 from the Philippines). In addition, approximately 260 Australian Defence Force personnel, around 200 Japanese troops, and staff from other Philippine government agencies also took part. The NMESIS was deployed for the first time.	Missile defense, counter-landing live fires, and humanitarian assistance

43	Bilateral Exercise	4.23-28	Philippine Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USS Nimitz, USS Lena Sutcliffe Higbee, USS Gridley, USS Curtis Wilbur* USS Wayne E. Meyer, USNS John Lewis Japan: JS Ariake	Tactical Exercises (LINKEX and others), PHOTOEX
44	Bilateral Exercise	4.24	East China Sea to West Pacific	U.S., Japan	U.S.：1xB-1, 6xF-15E, 4xF-35A, 2xF-35B, 2xEA-18G,1xRC-135, 1xKC-135 Japan：4xF-15s	Tactical exercises (including Defensive Counter Air training)
45	Joint Sail	4.25	South China Sea	U.S., Australia	U.S.: USS Omaha Australia: HMAS Sydney	Coordinated maneuvering exercise, communications drills, and a variety of other combined operations
46	Joint Combined Counter-Landing and Live-Fire Exercise	4.28	Philippines, South China Sea	U.S., Philippines, Australia, (Japan as an observer)	More than 800 personnel from the U.S., Philippines and Australia	Counter-landing defense training, tactical artillery relocation via land/sea/air lift, synchronized firepower missions combining howitzers and HIMARS precision strikes, simulated amphibious invasion response drills, replenishment-at-sea and intelligence sharing
47	MMCA	4.29	South China Sea	U.S., Australia, the Philippines	U.S.: F/A-18 Hornets, F-16 Falcons, and a B-1B Lancer the Philippine: BRP Antonio Luna, AW-159 Wildcat helicopters and	Communications and anti-submarine warfare exercises and rotary and fixed wing flight operations

					FA-50PH fighter jets Australia: HMAS Sydney	
48	Exercise Croix du Sud	5.1-15	Coral Sea	U.S., France, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Fiji, German, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Tonga, U.K.和 Vanuatu	U.S.: USS Blue Ridge France: FS Vendémiaire, FS Auguste Bénébig , and one MH-60S.	Combined surface action group operations, maritime domain awareness operations, helicopter cross-deck operations, combined command and control capabilities, and information sharing
49	Trilateral U.S.-Australia-Philippines Joint Airborne Assault Exercise	5.4	the Philippines	U.S., Philippines, Australia, (Japan as an observer)	More than 1,200 troops from the U.S., Philippines, and Australia	Combined joint all-domain operation
50	Tiger Balm 2025	5.5-16	Singapore	U.S., Singapore	Singapore Army Forces (SAF) and the U.S. Army	Urban operations, command post operations
51	Maritime Counter-Special Operations Exercise	5.8-11	South Korea	U.S., South Korea	U.S.: USS William P. Lawrence South Korea: ROKS Yulgok Yi-I, ROKS Yang Man-chun, ROKS Dae Jo-yeong, ROKS Daegu, ROKS Donghae, ROKS Daecheong, Yoon Youngha-class patrol vessels, and a ROKN submarine.	Anti-submarine and mine warfare training, **maritime communications training and dynamic coordinated maneuvering.**
52	Bilateral Exercise	5.15	Japan	U.S., Japan	U.S.: MH-60R Japan: SH-60K	Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise
53	Integrated Battle Problem (IBP) 25.5	5.15-5.23	Japan	U.S.	U.S.: USS Warrior, USS Miguel Keith , MH-53E helicopter, and personnel from	Integrated Unmanned and Semi-Autonomous Combat

					Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit (EODMU) 5	
54	MCA	5.20	South China Sea	U.S., the Philippines	U.S.: USCGC Stratton and a P-8A the Philippine: BRP Ramon Alcaraz , BRP Gener Tinangag and BRP Domingo Deluana, an AW109, Super Tucano and Sokol helicopters, BRP Melchora Aquino	Maritime domain awareness, division tactics, maneuvering, and Visit, Board, Search and Seizure.
55	KAMANDAG 9	5.26-6.6	the Philippines	U.S., the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, U. K., and other partners	U.S. Marine Corps, Philippine Marine Corps, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, and South Korean Marine Corps, etc.	Live-fire scenarios, jungle operations, and maritime landings
56	Joint Air Assault Training Exercise	5.29	the Philippines	U.S., the Philippines	CH-47, UH-60	Real-time sync, fast troop deployment, and airfield security procedures
57	MCA	6.4	South China Sea	U.S., the Philippines	U.S.: P-8A, the U.S. Marine Corps' 3d Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction Systems (NMESIS) the Phillipine: BRP Miguel Malvar , one W-3A Sokol helicopter, and BRP Cabra	Communication checks, exercising maritime domain awareness, data sharing, and combined targeting exercises against simulated targets using NMESIS

58	Pacific Griffin 2025	6.7-18	Guam	U.S., Singapore	U.S.: Sailors and Marines from Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Commander, Task Force (CTF) 72; CTF-74; CTF-76; and DESRON 7, USS William P. Lawrence and a P-8A Singapore: RSS Supreme , with an embarked S-70B Seahawk naval helicopter, RSS Sovereignty , and two Fokker-50 maritime patrol aircraft	Combined maritime operations
59	Bilateral Exercise	6.8	Philippine Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USCGC Stratton Japan: JS Tokiwa	Replenishment at Sea
60	Bilateral MCM Exercise	6.10-22	Japan	U.S., Japan	U.S.: EOD Mobile Unit 5 (EODMU5) Japan: Surface Units (MST (2), MSO (1), MSC (4))	Mine Warfare (Mine Sweeping, Mine Hunting and EOD) Exercise
61	Trilateral Training	6.18	East China Sea	U.S., Japan, South Korea	U.S:4xF-16s Japan: 2xF-2s South Korea: 2xF-15s	Tactical training
62	Bersama Warrior 2025	6.18-26	Malaysia	U.S., Malaysia	Mix of active duty, reserve, and National Guard service members from the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force, and Malaysian Armed Forces	Planning and coordination across a range of mission sets, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, amphibious operations, and joint fires integration
63	Trilateral Exercise	6.16-20	Japan	U.S., Japan, the Philippines	U.S.: USCGC Stratton Japan: JCG Asanagi, the Phillipine: BRP Teresa Magbanua	trilateral search-and-rescue exercise (SAREX)

64	Cope Angel 25-1	6.23-27	Okinawa	U.S., Japan	U.S.: Air Force Airmen assigned to the 33rd and 31st Rescue Squadrons partnered Japan: Air Self-Defense Force members from the Naha Air Rescue Squadron	Bilateral personnel recovery exercise
65	CARAT Indonesia 2025	6.23-30	Indonesia	U.S., Indonesia	U.S.: P-8A, USS Curtis Wilbur, and an MH-60R helicopter	Maritime domain awareness, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, force protection, anti-air warfare, anti-sea warfare and anti-submarine warfare
66	Pacific Partnership 2025	6.27-12.1	Pacific Ocean	U.S., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, and U.K., among others.	U.S.: USS Pearl Harbor, USS John L. Canley	Maritime humanitarian and civic assistance mission
67	CARAT Thailand 2025	7.7-16	Thailand	U.S., Thailand, Canada	U.S.: USS Santa Barbara, with an embarked MH-60S Seahawk helicopter Thailand: HTMS Naresuan, HTMS Saiburi, and HTMS Rattanakosin	Anti-submarine warfare exercises, air defense exercises, surface action group (SAG) coordination, visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations, mine countermeasures, and search and rescue training.
68	Cope Thunder 25-2	7.7-18	the Philippines	U.S., the Philippines	US Air advisors from Pacific Air Forces and Air Mobility Command coordinated with PAF counterparts	Air-to-ground strike operations, airdrop tactics, aircraft and munitions maintenance,

						fueling procedures, supply practices, airfield operations and Agile Combat Employment
69	Resolute Force Pacific 2025	7.10-8.8	Pacific Ocean	U.S. and allies and partners	over 350 joint and coalition aircraft and more than 12,000 members	Contingency response exercise
70	Trilateral Exercise	7.11	East China Sea	U.S., Japan, South Korea	U.S.: 2xB-52 Japan: 2xF-2s，1xKC-767 South Korea: 1xF-15，2xF-16s，1xKC-330	Tactical exercises
71	Submarine Exercise 25-1 (SUBEX)	7.11-12	Pacific Ocean	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USS Santa Fe Japan: a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force submarine	Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise, PHOTOEX
72	Mobility Guardian25	7.13-27	Guam, Tinian Island, Palau	U.S., Japan	U.S.: C-17 Japan: C-130H and approximately 50 personnel	Tactical airlift training, rapid deployment training
73	MINEX 2JA 2025	7.14-29	Japan	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USS Warrior , personnel from Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit (EODMU) 5, Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron Fifteen detachment, members of the U.S. Marine Corps Littoral Explosive Ordnance Neutralization, and staff assigned to MCMGRU 7 Japan: two frigates, two ocean minesweepers, two minesweeper tenders, six coastal minesweepers, Kawasaki P-1 and P-3C	Mine hunting, detection, and neutralization

					aircraft, two mine countermeasures helicopters (MCH) and multiple embarked Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units	
74	Joint Agile Combat Employment Training	7.15-23	Okinawa	U.S.	U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps personnel	Joint Agile Combat Employment training
75	MCA	7.16	South China Sea	U.S., the Philippines	U.S.: USS Curtis Wilbur and a P-8A the Philippine: BRP Miguel Malvar , BRP Cabra and BRP Suluan	Communication checks, exercising maritime domain awareness, data sharing, and combined targeting exercises against simulated targets
76	Expeditionary Missile Reload Simulation at Sea	7.28	Townsville, Australia	U.S.	U.S.: USS Higgins	Expeditionary Missile Reload Simulation At Sea
77	Multilateral Exercise	8.4-12	West Pacific	U.S., Japan, U.K., Australia, Norway, Spain	U.S.: USS George Washington, USS Robert Smalls, USS Shoup, USS America Japan: JS Kaga, JS Teruzuki, Submarine U.K.: HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Dauntless, HMS Richmond, RFA Tidespring Australia: HMAS Brisbane Norway: HNoMS Roald Amundsen Spain: ESPS Méndez Núñez	Tactical Exercise (Anti-Submarine Warfare), Cross Deck, PHOTOEX and others.
78	Bilateral Exercise	8.15	Philippine Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: MT Steiner Imperative Japan: JS Oumi	Replenishment at Sea
79	Ulchi Freedom Shield 25	8.18-28	South Korea	U.S., South Korea		Live-fire, constructive and

						field training exercises
80	Pacific Vanguard 2025	8.24-9.3	Guam	U.S., Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea	U.S.: USS Higgins, USNS Richard E. Byrd and P-8A Australia: P-8A Japan: JS Ise, JS Oumi, JS Suzunami South Korea:ROKS Wang Geo	Maritime operations, anti-submarine warfare, air warfare, and missile exercise
81	Super Garuda Shield 25	8.24-9.4	Indonesia	U.S., Indonesia, Australia, Japan, U. K., South Korea, Netherlands, Singapore, Canada, France, Germany, Brazil	U.S.: USS John Finn	Engineering civic action program, staff training exercises, cyber exercises, airborne operations, jungle field training exercises, air assault operations, an amphibious exercise, a large field training exercise and combined arms live fire exercises, and a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) live fire exercise
82	MMCA	9.2-3	South China Sea	U.S., Australia, Canada, the Philippines	U.S.: P-8A Australia: HMAS Brisbane, a P-8A Canada: HMCS Ville de Québec the Philippine: BRP Jose Rizal and BRP Miguel Malvar	Tactical exercises
83	Rescue Flag IWAKUNI	9.2-12	Japan	U.S., Japan	U.S.: MC-130J, HH-60W， F-35B, MV-22, AH-1, CH-53 Japan: US-2，U-125A, UH-60J	Search and Rescue Exercise

84	Bilateral Exercise	9.4-5	Philippine Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USS Higgins Japan: JS Ise, JS Suzunami	Tactical exercises
85	Multilateral Exercise	9.9-14	East China Sea to West Pacific	U.S., Japan, U.K., Australia, Canada, Norway	U.S.: USS Higgins, USS Rapa Hannock Japan: JS Kaga, JS Akebono U.K.: HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Dreadnought, HMS Richmond Australia: HMS Brisbane Canada: HMCS Ville de Québec Norway: HNoMS Roald Amundsen	Tactical Exercise (Anti-Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare), Replenishment at Sea, Cross Deck, PHOTOEX and others.
86	Trilateral Exercise	9.11	Philippine Sea	U.S., Japan, U.K.	U.S.: 2xF-35A,1xF-35B,4xF-15E,3xEA-18G,1xE-3,3xKC-135,1xRC-135,1xHC-130,1xKC-130 Japan: 2xF-15 U.K.: 7xF35B	Tactical exercises
87	MMCA	9.11-13	South China Sea	U.S., Japan, the Philippines	Japan: JS Osumi, the Philippine: BRP Jose Riza U.S.: USS John Finn and a P-8A	Tactical exercises
88	Resolute Dragon 25	9.12-25	Japan	U.S., Japan	he U.S. Marine Corps' III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF)	Command Post Exercise, anti-tank missile deployments, rapid air-ground task force deployment, chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) training, and establishing Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARP).

89	Bilateral Training	9.15-16	South China Sea	U.S., Australia	U.S.: USS Dewey Australia: HMAS Ballarat	Formation sailing exercise, maritime communications training, simulated fires exercises, information sharing, combined transit through the South China Sea
90	Freedom Edge 25	9.15-19	East China Sea	U.S., Japan, South Korea	U.S.: USS Blue Ridge, USS Curtis Wilbur Japan: JS Hyuga, Js Haguro, P-1, SH-60K, F-15, E-767, KC-767, and KC-46A South Korea: ROKS Wang Geon, ROKS Yulgok Yi I, ROKS Daecheong	Defense forces execute ballistic missile defense; defensive counter-air; anti-surface warfare; maritime interdiction operations; visit, board, search and seizure; counter-piracy, medical evacuation; and replenishment-at-sea operations.
91	Bilateral Live-fire Exercise	9.18-19	Japan	U.S., Japan	the U.S. Marine Corps and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force	High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Rapid Insertion training
92	Silver Flag 2025	9.20-9.28	Guam	U.S., Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines	U.S.: The 11th Combat Air Base Squadron Japan: Approx. 20 JASDF personnel	Command Post activity training, Airfield Damage Repair training, and Explosive Ordinance Disposal training
93	Bilateral Exercise	9.22-10.2	Palau	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USN Naval Mobile Construction Battalion group 4, Amphibious Construction Battalion 1 Japan: JMSDF IPD25 Engineering Team	Facility repair training

94	Trilateral Exercise	9.26	East China Sea	U.S., Japan, Australia	U.S.: 2xF-35A,1xKC-135 Japan: 3xF-15，1xKC-46A Australia: 3xF35A，1xKC-30A	Tactical exercises
95	Bushido Guardian 25	9.29-10.10	Japan	U.S., Japan, Australia, the Philippines	Approximately 350 U.S. Airmen will train alongside 300 JASDF and 100 RAAF service members in BG25	Tactical training
96	Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercise	8.5-8、9.5-14	Singapore, South China Sea	U.S., Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Singapore	U.S.: P-8A India: P-8I	Intelligence-sharing, simulated vessel tracking
97	Bilateral Exercise	10.22-28	Waters near Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean	U.S., India	U.S.: P-8A India: P-8I	Anti-submarine warfare, maritime domain awareness training
98	Bilateral Exercise	10.1	East China Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.:3xF-16,2xKC-135 Japan.:6xF-15	Tactical exercises
99	Bilateral Exercise	10.2	Japan	U.S., Japan	U.S.:MH-60R Japan:SH-60K	Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise
100	SAMASAMA 2025	10.6-17	Philippines、South China Sea	U.S., the Philippines, Australia, Japan, France, U.K., Thailand, Italy, Canada and New Zealand	U.S. : USS Cincinnati the Philippines: BRP Antonio Luna, BRP Ramon Alcaraz, BRP Valentin Diaz, BRP Lolinato To-Ong Japan: JS Ōnami Canada: HMCS Max Bernays	Sea replenishment approaches, air defense, anti-submarine warfare exercise
101	Marine Aviation Support Activity (MASA) 25	10.15-24	Philippines、South China Sea	U.S., Philippines	About 654 personnel of US and Philippine Marine Corps	Coastal defense and maritime strike, military free fall, helicopter underway

						emergency training
102	Annual Exercise (ANNUALEX) 2025	10.20-31	Philippine Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S. : USS Shoup, USS Robert Smalls , P-8A, USNS Amelia Earhart, USNS Wally Schirra , USNS Tippecanoe, a U.S. submarine, and F-35B Japan: JS Kaga Participating forces will also include the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Air Force (RAAF), Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Air Force (RCAF), France Navy (FN), and Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF).	Maritime communication tactics, anti-submarine warfare operations, air warfare operations, replenishment-at-sea, and more
103	CARAT Brunei 2025	10.25-30	Brunei、South China Sea	U.S., Brunei	U.S.: USS Cincinnati Brunei: offshore patrol vessel	VBSS drills, air defense exercises, division tactics and live-fire gunnery exercises
104	MMCA	10.30-31	South China Sea	U.S., Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines	U.S. : USS Fitzgerald, and a P-8A Australia: HMAS Ballarat New Zealand: HMNZS Aotearoa the Philippine : BRP Jose Riza, a AW159 , three A-29B Super Tucano, a W-3A Sokol multipurpose combat helicopter	Tactical exercises
105	Multinational Mine Warfare Exercise (MNMIWEX) 25	10.31	South Korea	U.S., South Korea, and 15 partner and allied nations	Explosive ordnance disposal(EOD) personnel from all nations	Mine Warfare Exercise

106	Bilateral Exercise	11.2-4	Philippine Sea to East China Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USS George Washington, USS Robert Smalls, USS Milius Japan: JS Haguro	Tactical Exercises (LINKEX), PHOTOEX and others
107	Carrier Strike Group Exercise (CSGEX) 2025	11.10-14	South Korea	U.S., South Korea	U.S.: USS George Washington, USS Robert Smalls, USS Milius, USS Shoup, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit (EODMU) 5 South Korea: ROKS Seoae Ryu Seong Ryong, ROKS Yulgok Yi I, ROKS Wang Geon, ROKS Gang Gam Chan, ROKS Cheonji and ROKS Daecheong	Bilateral maritime communication tactics, anti-submarine warfare operations, air warfare operations, replenishment-at-sea, and more
108	Malabar 2025	11.11-18	Guam	U.S., Australia, India, Japan	U.S.: One P-8A, one submarine, one mobile explosive ordnance disposal team, and USS Fitzgerald Australia: HMAS Ballarat India: INS Sayadri Japan: JS Hyuga	Advanced maneuvering scenarios, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, information sharing, maritime operations, and various subject matter expert exchanges
109	Bilateral Exercise	11.13	Okinawa	U.S., Japan	U.S.: P-8A Japan: P-3C	Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise
110	Bilateral Exercise	11.14	Philippine Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: EA-18G Japan: JS SAWAGIRI, P-1, EP-3, OP-3C	Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare Exercise
111	MMCA	11.14-15	South China Sea	U.S., Japan, the Philippines	U.S.: USS Nimitz, USS Wayne Meyer , USS Gridley, and USS Lenah Sutcliffe Higbee the Philippines: BRP Jose Rizal , BRP Antonio Luna, and an	Tactical exercises

					AW159 Japan: JS Akebono and an SH-60K Seahawk helicopter	
112	Bilateral Exercise	11.15	Japan Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: 1xB-1B Japan: 2xF-15，2xF-2	Tactical exercises
113	Bilateral Exercise	11.17	East China Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: 2xB-1B，12xF-35A，2xEA-18G，1xE-3G，2xKC-135，1xRC-135，1xP-8A Japan: 4xF-15，2xF-2	Tactical exercises
114	Maritime Counter Special Operations Forces Exercise (MCSOFEX)	11.17-20	South Korea	U.S., South Korea	U.S.:USS Dewey, one MH-60R helicopter, two AH-060E helicopters, and one P-8A	Anti-submarine warfare training, anti-air warfare training, joint maritime interdiction operations, and dynamic formation sailing
115	MINEX 3JA 2025	11.12-26	Japan	U.S., Japan	U.S.: personnel from Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit (EODMU) 5, Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron (HM) 15 detachment, members of the U.S. Marine Corps Littoral Explosive Ordnance Neutralization, and staff assigned to MCMGRU 7 Japan: one frigate, four ocean minesweepers, two minesweeper tenders, 11 coastal minesweepers, two mine countermeasures helicopters (MCH) and multiple embarked EOD units	Mine Warfare Exercise

116	CARAT Malaysia 2025	12.04-10	Strait of Malacca	U.S., Malaysia	U.S.: USS Cincinnati, P-8A Malaysia: KD Lekiu	Communications drills, simulated air defense exercises, formation sailing
117	Bilateral Exercise	12.8-11	Philippine Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: USS Washington, USS Dewey Japan: JS Akizuki	Tactical Exercises (LINKEX)
118	MCA	12.9-10	South China Sea	U.S., the Philippines	U.S.: USS Rafael Peralta, P-8A the Philippines: FA-50 light combat aircraft and A-29B light attack aircraft, BRP Jose Rizal	Helicopter cross deck and maneuver exercises, communications checks, and shared maritime domain awareness
119	Bilateral Exercise	12.10	Japan Sea	U.S., Japan	U.S.: 2xB-52 Japan: 3xF-15，3xF-35	Tactical exercises
120	ASEAN-U.S. Maritime Exercise	12.10-11	Indonesia	U.S, ASEAN members	U.S.: USS Cincinnati	Tactical maneuvers, damage control, search and rescue, and MEDEVAC exercises
121	Silent Shark 2025	12.11	Guam	U.S., South Korea	U.S.: one fast-attack submarine South Korea: ROKS Ahn Mu	Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise
122	MCA	12.15	South China Sea	U.S., the Philippines	U.S.: USS Robert Smalls, P-8A the Philippines: BRP Miguel Malvar	Maneuver exercises, communications checks, and shared maritime domain awareness

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