The Changing Balance of Power and its Influence in the South China Sea

Editor's Note：On October 7th–8th, Hu Bo, director of  SCSPI and Director of Center for Maritime Strategy at Peking University were invited to attend the 18th South China Sea International Conference hosted by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in Hanoi, Vietnam. He delivered a keynote address titled “The Changing Balance of Power and Its Influence in the South China Sea.”

Thank you, ambassador, and thank you for the invitation. And good morning, colleagues. When we're talking about, the balance of power. First of all, we need to review the power distribution in the South China Sea and beyond.

The Balance of Power Situation

Definitely, China and the United States are the most, I think two most capable and powerful actors in the South China Sea and beyond.

Since 2008 and 2009, the US had increased its military activities and presence in the South China Sea. The presence and activities of US military in the South China Sea has been doubled in ten years.

Every year, there are ten thousand sorties of military aircraft and almost 2,000 ship-days of warships operating in the South China Sea.

According to our observation, around 2023, the US military activities and presence in the South China Sea had reached the peak. In the recent two or three years, some of military activities of United States and presence has been decreased a little bit. Anyway, the numbers are still very huge. I think it's difficult for the US to continue to increase its military activities and presence in the South China Sea. 

After three decades of modernization, Chinese military has made very historical achievement. Nowadays, the PLA's capabilities, both of numbers and quality, can match US military in the South China Sea and beyond.

General speaking, I think both sides had advantages and disadvantages in the South China Sea. Neither side can KO or defeat the other side easily.

Besides, the other coast states of the South China Sea, for instance, Vietnam, the Malaysia, Indonesia, their capabilities have also been improved a lot, especially the coast guards and law enforcement forces. Moreover, the Southeast Asia countries have invested some kind of A2/AD capabilities.

Their capabilities could not compare that of China and the US, but geography matters. To the Pacific, South China Sea is too small; well, to the human beings, South China Sea is still very large.  3.5 million kilometers square is very large for any actor. It is nonsense to say that China will and can control the South China Sea. No matter how many warships China and US have, I think they couldn't control the South China Sea because of geography. As to the sea control, usually the most important thing is to control the checkpoints. In this sense, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, which are close to the Strait of Malacca, have better position than China to control the South China Sea. 

The third category of actors in the South China is other extra regional powers. For instance, Australia, Canada and European countries. Their military activities in the South China Sea also have been increased a lot in recent years. But frankly speaking, their military meaning is limited. Their deployments and activities in the South China Sea have more political and diplomatic rather than the military meanings. In the military perspective, their military activities and presence cannot alter the balance of power in the South China Sea.

Interactions and Intentions

The final point I want to share is that interactions and intensions among the different actors in the South China Sea.

Firstly, we talk about China-US strategic stability. The summit of this May in Beijing just used the term constructive strategic stability. It seems that China-US relationship is in stabilizing. Of which, the most important and major consensus for both sides is that “we are in the competition, but we don't want to fight with each other.”

The signal is very clear from both sides. Obviously, it's not a secret that both sides are preparing for the worst scenarios. But also, they have made very clearly that they don't want to have a direct military confrontation and war, which may be the most major consensus for the constructive strategic stability.

This kind of stabilizing is not a short term but a long-term process. And this kind of stabilizing has not just began in Donald Trump's second term but since the late of second term of Joe Biden. And also, the stabilizing is the compromise and consensus after a long-term competition from 2009, especially in the maritime domain.

After San Francisco summit in November 2023, the both militaries have resumed all the channels and dialogues, and both sides have shown self-restraints on operations in the South China Sea and beyond. Nowadays, every day there are more than 10 times encounters happened in the South China Sea between the two militaries. But we have seen very fewer unsafe encounters. That's a positive improvement compared to two or three years ago.

And as to the South China Sea disputes, it is generally controllable. Maritime disputes is a worldwide phenomenon, there are also Arctic disputes and other disputes, not just in the South China Sea. The South China Sea disputes can generally be controllable. Nowadays, the maritime disputes between China and Malaysia, as well as China and Vietnam, are relatively well-managed; the sole exception is between China and the Philippines. But sometimes I'm tired of talking about China-Philippines conflicts in the South China Sea. We should not let China-Philippines disputes and conflicts to dominate ASEAN and regional agendas.

Finally, I want to share my understanding on China's intentions in the South China Sea. China's claim is very consistent. It’s unprofessional to say that China use the dash line to claim the South China Sea. Actually, the dash line just defines the scope of China different claims inside it. The dash line itself is not a legal base for China’s claims. The media is always saying that China use the dash line to claim 90% percent of the South China Sea. However, when it comes to academic and policy expressions, there should be some differences. China has repeatedly stated its four types of claims in the South China Sea, which is the sovereignty of the four island groups including Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands and Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal, the internal waters and territorial seas of these island groups, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of these island groups, and historic rights.

China's policy towards the South China Sea disputes is also very consistent. Even now, Beijing is following the Deng Xiaoping’s principle of shelving disputes. China is keeping the status quo rather than changing the status quo. Compared to twenty or thirty years ago, the only change is China's capability and resolve to defend its sovereignty and maritime rights.